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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commission's 
determination that Petitioner's work related injuries do not entitle him to permanent total 
disability benefits. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1953, as amended) and Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801 
(8) (1997). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the Utah Labor Commission make adequate, proper, and complete 
Findings of Fact, and as a corallary issue, is the Commission's determination supported by 
the record? 
Standard: In reviewing the factual findings of an administrative agency, the appellate 
Court reviews the "whole record" before the Court, and considers not only the evidence 
supporting the agency's factual findings, but also the evidence that "fairly detracts from the 
weight of the [Commission's] evidence." The agency's Findings of Fact will be affirmed 
only if they are "supported by substantial evidence." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 
776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally construed and 
any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner, (e.g. State Tax 
Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); and McPhie v. 
Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977).) 
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Preservation for appeal: This issue was raised by Petitioner in a Motion for 
Reconsideration which was denied by the Utah Labor Commission. A Petition for Review 
was timely filed. 
Issue 2: Did the Commission correctly apply Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413 to the facts 
of this case? 
Standard: This issue involves the interpretation and application of statutory 
provisions. A "correction of error" standard is applied to such issues. Esquivel v. Labor 
Commission, 7 P.3d 780 (Utah 2000). This is because it involves a question of law and no 
deference to the agency's view of the law is required. Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
Utah Code Ann..§63-46b-16(4)(d)(l 988V Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817P.2d 
328 (Utah 1991). Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P. 2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
Preservation for appeal: This issue was raised by Petitioner in a Motion for 
Reconsideration which was denied by the Utah Labor Commission. A Petition for Review 
was timely filed. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413( 1997)1, is the applicable permanent total disability 
statute and is attached in full in Addendum "A". The parties agree that at dispute is the 
application of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413 (1) (c) (iv) which provides as follows: 
1
 At the time of Mr. Shearer's work related injury, the Workers' Compensation statute provisions 
for permanent total disability compensation were codified as §35-1-67. Shortly thereafter, §35-1-67 
was renumbered as §34A-2-413, without any substantive changes. For ease of reference, the parties 
have referred to the Act as it is currently numbered. 
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(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall 
conclude that:... 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into 
consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, 
and residual functional capacity. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: The Petitioner, Gordon Shearer, seeks review of the Labor 
Commission's denial of his claim for permanent total disability benefits from his work 
related injuries. 
Course of Proceedings: On January 26, 1998, Mr. Shearer filed an Application for 
Hearing claiming permanent total disability benefits sustained as the result of his industrial 
injury of June 23, 1995. (Rl at 4-29). The employer and its workers compensation carrier 
filed an Answer to the Application on March 4, 1998. (Rl at 32-33). After several 
continuances, Notice of Formal Hearing was sent to all parties on August 6,1999, setting Mr. 
Shearer's claim for hearing on October 20, 1999. (Rl at 157). 
The Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, dated June 10,2000, finding Mr. Shearer permanently and totally disabled as a result 
of his industrial accident and ordered the payment of appropriate benefits. (Rl at 217-236). 
A signed copy of said Order is attached hereto as Addendum "B". 
The Employer/Carrier filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission 
on February 25, 2000. (R2 at 242-256). The Motion for Review was granted by the 
Commission on June 30, 2000, wherein the Commission found that Mr. Shearer was not 
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entitled to permanent total disability benefits. (R2. at 281-284). A signed copy of said Order 
is attached hereto as Addendum "C". 
On July 19, 2000, Mr. Shearer filed a Request for Reconsideration with the Utah 
Labor Commission, requesting in part, that this matter be remanded to the Administrative 
Law Judge for the purpose of retaking Mr. Shearer's direct testimony, as it inadvertently was 
not recorded. (R2 at 335-352). The Commission issued an Order of Remand on August 30, 
2000, directing the retaking of the omitted testimony. (R2 at 413-414). A telephone 
conference call was conducted on June 4, 2001, for the purpose of recording Mr. Shearer's 
testimony. (R2 at 420-421). On August 27, 2001, the Utah Labor Commission entered an 
Order Denying Request for Reconsideration. (R2. at 427-432). A signed copy of said Order 
is attached hereto as Addendum "D". 
A Petition for Review of Agency Action was timely filed with this Court on or about 
September 25, 2001. (R2 at 433-440). 
Statement of Facts: A complete, detailed, and comprehensive Statement of Facts is 
contained in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order by the Administrative Law 
Judge, attached hereto as Exhibit "A". (Rl at 217-236). The Utah Labor Commission's 
Order Granting Motion for Review, dated June 30,2000, and attached hereto as Exhibit "B", 
supplanted the 52 detailed Findings of Fact of the Administrative Law Judge with five 
general findings of its own. (R2 at 281-284). The Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration, attached hereto as Exhibit "C", is likewise skimpy on the facts. (R2 at 427-
432). 
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Since Petitioner challenges the Commission's Findings of Fact, a detailed marshaling 
of the relevant facts is incorporated in the various legal arguments discussed below. An 
overall summary of the facts, however, is set forth here for continuity. 
Petitioner was injured in the course and scope of his employment with Lin's 
Marketplace, a grocery store located in Hurricane, Utah. (Rl at 1). Mr. Shearer began 
working for Lin's Marketplace in May of 1988, as the Frozen Food and Dairy Manager. His 
duties included ordering and stocking merchandise in the frozen food and dairy sections of 
the market, although he described the work as 90 percent stocking merchandise. (Rl at 218. 
See also, ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Addendum "B" page 2, 
paragraph 1). 
On June 23,1995, the Petitioner was moving a pallet of frozen food on a pallet jack. 
He squatted and reached down to lift and drag the pallet which he estimated weighed 
between 10 and 15 pounds. He dragged the pallet 3 to 4 feet, but then felt a pain in his low 
and mid back. He reported the injury and went immediately home. (Rl at 1 and 217. See 
also, Addendum "B", ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 2, 
paragraph 4). 
He sought chiropractic care with Dr. Nile Kennedy on June 26, 1995, and received 
treatments from him until August 4, 1995. (R5 at 68-91). On August 1, 1995, Mr. Shearer 
was examined by Dr. Max Root, who recommended a course of physical therapy and 
released him to return to work with permanent light duty restrictions. (R5 at 118-132). 
Mr. Shearer attempted to return to work in August of 1995, running the video rental 
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counter at Lin's Marketplace. However, he aggravated his back injury and was again taken 
off work. (R2 at 219. See also, Addendum "B", ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order, page 3, paragraph 6). 
On August 30, 1995, Mr. Shearer received an MRI of the lumbar spine at Dixie 
Regional Medical Center, which was read to show a herniated disk. (R5 at 111-112). On 
September 25,1995, Dr. Muir performed a laminotomy, foraminotomy, and discectomy. (R5 
at 113 and 124). 
On January 6, 1995, Mr. Shearer returned to Dr. Muir. Although he was not having 
the same amount of pain he had prior to surgery, he was complaining of back pain and felt 
that he could not tolerate the repeated bending associated with his employment duties. 
Rather than undergo another surgery, Dr. Muir recommended that Mr. Shearer cease working 
and take early retirement. (R5 at 126. See also, Addendum "B", ALJ's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, page 4, paragraph 12). 
The Petitioner has not worked for wages since January 5,1996. (Rl at 220. See also, 
Addendum "B", ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 4, paragraph 
13). He applied for and eventually received Social Security Disability benefits effective in 
January of 1996. (Rl at 182-184. See also, Addendum "B", the ALJ's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, page 4, paragraph 14). 
On February 9, 1996, Dr. Root concurred in the Petitioner's decision to apply for 
Social Security Disability benefits as he felt Mr Shearer could no longer work. (R5 at 128. 
See also, Addendum "B", ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 7, 
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paragraph 25). 
At the time of his injury in June of 1995, Mr. Shearer was 64 years old. Although 
capable of applying for early retirement, he testified that he did not want to retire but had 
planned to continue working until he was 70 years old. At that time, he planned to work 12 
to 18 antique shows a year until he reached age 75. At the time of the hearing on Mr. 
Shearer's Application for permanent total disability benefits, he was 68 years old. (Rl at 6 
and 220. See also, Addendum "B", ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
page 4, paragraph 15). 
On February 26, 1996, Dr. Root assigned a 10 percent whole person permanent 
impairment rating for the Petitioner's herniated disc, which was stabilized with surgery. (R5 
at 129). 
Two functional capacity evaluations (FCE) of Mr. Shearer were performed. The first 
FCE was performed on three separate dates, January 16, 18, and 23, in 1996. Physical 
therapist, Virgil Beck, conducted the FCE and concluded that Mr. Shearer could only 
perform sedentary work. (R5 at 34-45). The second evaluation was performed at the request 
of the insurance carrier by physical therapist, Dell Felix, on May 14,1999. Mr. Felix found 
that Mr. Shearer was capable of working at a medium physical demand level. (Rl at 190-
193). 
Mr. Dirk Evertsen, a vocational rehabilitation provider hired by Respondents, testified 
at the hearing that there were only two jobs which would be suitable for Petitioner, one being 
a convenience store clerk, and the other being a night watchman. At the time of the hearing, 
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only the night watchman position remained open. (R4, hearing transcript at 99, lines 18-25, 
and page 100, lines 1-4. See also, Addendum "B", ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order, page 11, paragraph 49). 
Although the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Shearer was permanently 
and totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident (Rl at 234. See also Addendum 
"B"), the Utah Labor Commission reversed, finding that Petitioner failed to show that he 
could not perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration his age, 
education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. (R2 at 
281-284 and 427-432. See also Addendum "C" and "D"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties concede that pursuant to the permanent total disability statute contained 
in Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413, the Petitioner has demonstrated that he is not gainfully 
employed, that he has an impairment that limits his ability to do basic work activities, and 
that by reason of his work related injuries, he is prevented from performing the essential 
functions of his prior work. The sole issue on appeal is whether Mr. Shearer can "perform 
other work reasonably available, taking into consideration his age, education, past work 
experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity." 
In rendering its determination that Petitioner is not entitled to permanent total 
disability benefits, the Labor Commissioner makes no reference to any of the evidence 
favorable to Mr. Shearer. All evidence in favor of the claim is ignored, and all doubt is 
resolved in favor of denying benefits. The Commissioner's Findings of Fact are so 
erroneous, incomplete, and inaccurate that they become arbitrary and capricious. Rather than 
act as an impartial fact finder, the Respondent Commissioner has assumed the role of an 
advocate for denying benefits to the injured worker. His purported findings are not 
supported by the record, are legally insufficient, and must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY IN 
FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO 
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED 
WORKER. 
Few principles of workers' compensation law are as well established in this state as 
the principle that workers' compensation disability claims are to be liberally construed in 
favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in 
favor of the petitioner. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this principle from 1919 to 
the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); J & W Janitorial Co. 
v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission. 610 
P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980): McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); Baker 
v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. Industrial Commission. 391 
P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); 
and Chandler v. Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
9 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, discussed the proper construction of the 
Workers' Compensation Act and the underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows: 
We are also reminded that our statute requires that the statutes of this 
state are to be 'liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice.' 
In this connection it must be remembered that the compensation 
provided for in the act is in no sense to be considered as damages for the 
injured employee or to his dependents in case death supervenes. The right to 
compensation arises out of the relation existing between employer and 
employee, and that the injury arises out of [or] in the course of the 
employment. Under such an act the costs and expenses of conducting the 
business or enterprise, including compensation for injuries to employees or 
other casualties, must be taxed to the business. The theory of the 
Compensation Act is that the whole cost and expense of conducting the 
business as aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are produced and 
sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs and expenses are borne by the 
public; that is, by the consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such 
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those dependent upon him, and 
in case of his serious injury or death to provide adequate means for the support 
of those dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of total disability 
or death of the employee, his dependents might become the objects of public 
charity, such a calamity is avoided by requiring the business or enterprise to 
provide for such dependents, with the right of the employer to add the amount 
that is paid out to the cost of producing and selling the product of such 
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such acts are therefore 
apparent to all and for that reason, if for no other, should receive a very liberal 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are all united upon the 
proposition that in view of the purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in favor 
of the employee or his dependents as the case may be. Id. at 1021-1022. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, properly applied this vital rule of construction. Her findings and conclusions are 
detailed, thorough, and evidence a "liberal construction" and "resolution of doubt in favor 
of the claim." The Respondent Utah Labor Commission in rendering its Order Granting 
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Motion for Review (R2 at 281-284. See also, Addendum "C") and Order Denying Request 
for Reconsideration (R2 at 427-432. See also, Addendum "D") failed to recognize and apply 
this cornerstone rule of construction in Utah workers5 compensation law. The 
Commissioner made only the most general and passing reference to the facts, and whenever 
any doubt or uncertainty appears in the record, the Commissioner construed it against the 
injured worker and in a light most favorable to the insurance company and the defeating of 
benefits. 
In light of the Commission's failure to make detailed and comprehensive findings, its 
failure to weigh the conflicting medical opinions as to the Petitioner's functional capacity 
and ability to return to any work, and the undue weight it gave to a flawed and defective 
vocational rehabilitation report (as set forth below), the entire underlying basis of the Order 
is flawed. The "findings" and "conclusions" do not evidence "humane and beneficent 
purposes" as required by law. The entire 
Order should be disregarded due to this conceptional flaw. 
II 
THE FINDINGS OF THE RESPONDENT UTAH LABOR COMMISSION IN 
DENYING PETITIONER PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS 
WERE ERRONEOUS, INCORRECT, AND ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AS 
A MATTER OF LAW, 
In Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990), cert. 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals has previously informed the 
Labor Commission that: 
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In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of the commission, 
the findings must be 'sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factually issue 
was reached.' Action v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
Ruckerv.Daltom 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979))... [T]he failure of an agency to 
make adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its findings 'arbitrary 
and capricious' unless the evidence is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of 
only one conclusion.' Id. (Quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 
(Utah 1983)). 
In Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commisson, 720 P.2d 1373,1378 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court clearly articulated the proper standard regarding findings of 
fact: 
The importance of complete, accurate, and consistent findings 
of fact is essential to a proper determination by an 
administrative agency. To that end, findings should be 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
factual conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are 
reached. . . Without such findings, this Court cannot . . . 
[protect] the parties and the public from arbitrary and capricious 
administrative action. 
Additionally, findings of fact are only adequate when they are supported by 
"substantial evidence" when viewed by the record as a whole. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(g). In applying the substantial evidence test, the Court must review the whole record 
including, "not only the evidence supporting the board's factual findings, but also the 
evidence that fairly detracts from the weight of the board's evidence." Grace Drilling 
Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). (Emphasis added). 
In finding Mr. Shearer entitled to permanent total disability benefits, the 
Administrative Law Judge made 52 detailed Findings of Fact supporting that conclusion. 
The Respondent, Utah Labor Commission, rejected those findings and made a scant five 
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findings in its Order Granting Motion for Review, which touched only in the most general 
way the issues on review. 
Petitioner, in his Motion for Reconsideration, raised the gross inadequacies of the 
Commission's Findings in the Order Granting Motion for Review. The Commission's 
response in its Order Denying Reconsideration was that: 
The Commission limited its fact finding to only those issues in actual 
dispute. With respect to the issues that were actually raised before it, the 
Commission acknowledges its duty to set forth the basis for its decision in 
adequate detail. The essential basis for the commission's decision is 
explained in its initial order. This second order supplements and amplifies 
the first. The Commission believes that its two decisions, when taken 
together, adequately explain the basis for its decision. (R. at 430. See also, 
Addendum "D"). 
Petitioner will thus quote extensively from both Commission Orders and show that 
any and all facts explicitly found by the Commission were inadequate to support its denial 
of permanent total disability benefits to Mr. Shearer. Furthermore, marshaling all of the 
evidence presented in this case demonstrates that an overwhelming case was made for the 
award of benefits. 
This is a claim for permanent total disability benefits. It is alleged that as a result 
of his work related injuries, Mr. Shearer can no longer work and is thus entitled to 
appropriate benefits for such an injury. No one disputes that Mr. Shearer was injured in 
the "course and scope of his employment" with Lin's Marketplace. There is no dispute 
that he has proved legal and medical causation for his injuries and that his work related 
injury of June 23, 1995, was responsible for at least a 10 percent impairment of the whole 
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person. It is likewise not disputed that he was not able to engage in sustained work 
following his injury and that he has not worked for any wages since January 5, 1996. 
It is admitted that Mr. Shearer has met most of the requirements under the 
permanent total disability statute. The only issue raised by Respondents is whether Mr. 
Shearer can, "perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration [his] 
age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity." 
(Utah Code Ann., § 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv)). 
Petitioner will address each of those factors in turn, marshal all evidence in support 
of the Commission's decision, and show that it is inadequate to support the 
Commission's legal conclusion that Mr. Shearer has failed to meet each of the 
requirements of the statute for the award of permanent total disability benefits. 
A. Age. At the time of his work related injury Mr. Shearer was 64 years of age, 
having been born on July 11, 1931. (Rl at 5). The Administrative Law Judge in her 
Findings of Fact, found that "At the time of the hearing [October 20, 1999] the Petitioner 
was 68 years old." (Rl at at 220. See also Addendum "B" ALJ's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law & Order, page 4, paragraph 15). The Utah Labor Commission made 
no finding as to Mr. Shearer's age in its Order Granting Motion for Review, but in its 
August 27, 2001, Order Denying Reconsideration, it found that he was now somehow 67 
years old! (R2. at 430. See also Addendum "D", page 4, paragraph 5). 
The Commissioner's finding as to age, the first factor to be considered under Utah 
Code Ann. §34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv), is obviously grossly in error. Petitioner asks this Court 
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to take judicial notice that given Mr. Shearer's undisputed birth date of July 11, 1931, 
that at the time of the Commission's August 27, 2001, Order he would actually have been 
70 years old. 
The Commission makes only the passing erroneous finding of Mr. Shearer's age 
and does not make any finding as to the ability of a 70 year old man (let alone even a 67 
year old man) to "perform other work reasonably available." Mr. Shearer's unsuccessful 
attempts to find other work (as set forth below) is indicative of the difficulties presented 
by his age alone. By any measure, Mr. Shearer has satisfied this requirement, and the 
Commissioner's finding on this issue must be disregarded. 
B. Education. In its Order Granting Motion for Review, the Labor Commission 
found that Mr. Shearer "is a high school graduate and has completed two years of 
accounting course work at Stevens-Henager School of Business. He also took courses in 
solar technology at Dixie College." (R2 at 282. See also Addendum "C", page 2, 
paragraph 3.) In its Order Denying Reconsideration, the Commission additionally found 
that "His educational history establishes his literacy and cognitive abilities." (R2 at 430, 
See also Addendum "D", page 4, paragraph 5.) No further legal conclusion is drawn 
from that limited educational history. 
The hearing testimony reveals that Mr. Shearer graduated from high school in 
1950, attended two years of business college between 1959 and 1961, and one year at 
Dixie College in 1981. (R6 at 7-8). He did not graduate from business college; his one 
year at Dixie, 20 years ago, was spent studying solar systems and alternate energy. The 
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present value of which has been eroded by recent scientific advances in those fields, 
making that education obsolete. He has not had any educational courses in the past 20 
years and has not used his accounting skills in the workforce since 1980. 
The Commission cites Mr. Shearer's limited education to establish literacy and 
cognitive abilities. No one disputes that he can read, write, and think. Literacy is not a 
disqualification from permanent total disability benefits! The criterion is whether his 
educational skills are such as to enable a 70 year old severely disabled man to find gainful 
employment. His relevant work history over the past 20 years has been of the manual 
variety. Any accounting skills which Mr. Shearer obtained 40 years ago have long since 
lost their currency. He has not had any recent work history in which his educational 
background would be of much benefit. In the workforce, Mr. Shearer would be 
competing against recent high school and college graduates with current skills. His 40 
year old post-secondary education can not fairly be held against his otherwise entitlement 
to permanent total disability benefits. 
C. Past Work History. In its Order Granting Motion for Review, the 
Commission makes the following finding of fact: 
Among other employment, Mr. Shearer worked as a supervisor in 
one of J.C. Penney's accounting units and as a bookkeeper for several 
businesses in Kamas, Utah. Later, he was employed by the U.S. Forest 
Service, primarily as a resource assistant preparing permits for timber sales. 
After 13 years with the Forest Service, followed by relatively short periods 
of employment in several varied positions, he worked as a cashier at Handy 
Mart and as a cashier/stocker at Lin's. 
(R2 at 282. See also Addendum "C", page 2, paragraph 4.) 
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In its Order Denying Reconsideration, the Commission makes only this additional 
relevant finding: ". . . his work history demonstrates an ability to function in a work 
environment. It also shows significant expertise in accounting and the ability to follow 
policies and rules." (R2 at 430. See also Addendum "D", page 4, paragraph 5.) 
The full record, which is not cited by the Commission, sets forth Mr. Shearer's 
complete work history which is as follows: 
a. While in the Army (1951-1954) Mr. Shearer was trained as a "scout 
sniper" and was sent to radar school, however it does not appear that 
he was ever able to apply those skills. At the hearing, legal counsel 
for the employer/carrier suggested that his sniper skills could qualify 
him for a job in the mafia! (R4, Hearing transcript at 4, lines 15-22). 
b. Discharged from the army, he worked as a bank teller for an 
unknown period of time. (R4, Hearing transcript at 4, lines 15-22). 
c. He sold insurance briefly, but then worked various odd jobs in 
factories such as in a battery factory and fabricating wire grocery 
bags. He also sold penny uranium stocks for 5 or 6 months and then 
filled cigarette machines. (R4, Hearing Transcript at 8-9). 
d. Thereafter, Petitioner worked at J. C. Penney doing inventory and in 
the bill of lading department and worked with the Forrest Service for 
13 to 15 years selling timber permits and other activities. After he 
left the Forest Service, he went to work for Western Thriftway doing 
the same type of work he had done for Respondent. (R4, Hearing 
transcript at 10; page 11 at lines 1-25; page 12 at lines 1-23; and 
page 14 at lines 14-25). 
e. Petitioner worked for St. George Steel thereafter doing janitorial 
work. 
(R4, Hearing transcript at 13, lines 2-6). 
f. Petitioner worked for the Park Service thereafter doing maintenance. 
(R4, Hearing transcript at 14, lines 12-22). 
g. Petitioner worked for Handi Mart thereafter as a cashier. (R4, 
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Hearing transcript at page 15, lines 9-19). 
h. He was employed at Lin's as the Frozen Food and Dairy Manager 
from 1988 to the date of his injury in 1995. (Rl at 6). 
The complete work history, as opposed to the selective Commission summary, 
shows that Mr. Shearer's work history for the past 20 years has been manual, in the 
nature of janitorial, maintenance, and cashier/stocker. At the time of his injury, Mr. 
Shearer had worked for seven consecutive years doing manual labor, stocking shelves at 
Lin's Marketplace. His prior work experience was generally limited to maintenance and 
janitorial positions. He admittedly had worked for the Forest Service and had been in the 
Army, but there was no evidence that he had any transferable job skills from those jobs 
he had worked 20 to 40 years previously. 
The Commission's finding that his work history shows "an ability to function in a 
work environment" is of no value in evaluating his ability to "perform other work 
reasonably available," as required by the statute. The work history is only important to 
show work skills that can now be applied in other work environments. All the 
Commission found was that his work history showed a history of working. 
The Respondent did obtain a vocational rehabilitation report by Mr. Dirk Evertsen, 
a so-called "rehabilitation specialist." Although Petitioners often complain that the 
insurance companies expert witness is a mere hired gun, that characterization seems to be 
appropriate in Mr. Evertsen's case. In 33 years of experience as a vocational 
rehabilitation specialist, he shockingly testified that out of 2,000 to 3,000 people he had 
evaluated, he did not believe that any of them would be a valid permanent total 
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disability candidate. (R4, Hearing transcript at 116, lines 17-25 and page 117, lines 1-
13.) The conclusion is compelling that if Mr. Evertsen has never seen a permanently 
totally disabled worker in 33 years out of thousands of injured workers, then perhaps he 
has a bias making him incapable of recognizing an individual with such a limitation. 
The Commission places great reliance on Mr. Evertson's vocation rehabilitation 
report and generally summarizes the findings of that evaluation which support their pre-
formed conclusion that Mr. Shearer was not permanently totally disabled. Completely 
omitted from the Commission's findings were the following uncontroverted aspects of 
Mr. Evertson's testimony which are favorable to Mr. Shearer and his claim: 
1. Petitioner, because of his disability, had an inability to access a substantial 
section of the open labor market as a result of his back injury. (R4, Hearing 
transcript at page 118, lines 9-13.) 
2. If Petitioner were required to lay down during an eight hour time period, as 
his medical records indicate, there would not be one job available for him 
under the dictionary of occupational titles. (R4, Hearing transcript at page 
120, lines 16-25 and page 121, line 1.) 
3. If Mr. Evertsen would have been provided the radiology report from Dixie 
Regional Medical Center where it indicates that Petitioner has a "focal right 
posterior paracentral disc herniation with inferior extrusion or free fragment 
affecting the right SI nerve root," he would have concerns about placing 
Petitioner in any of the jobs that he had identified. (R4, Hearing transcript 
at page 133, lines 18-25 and page 134, lines 1-21.) 
4. Petitioner has difficulty in twisting which would cause him pain and it 
would be very appropriate for him to have competent vocational 
rehabilitation counseling. However, the Commission felt otherwise based 
upon their reliance on selective portions of Mr. Evertson's report and 
testimony. (R4, Hearing transcript at page 136, lines 3-8). 
5. That in obtaining potential work, Shearer would have to be careful not to 
identify his disabilities because that would make it more difficult to obtain a 
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job. (R4, Hearing transcript at page 77, lines 18-23). 
6. That Lin's Marketplace did not have employment available for Mr. Shearer 
in his original line of work. (Rl at 227, See also Addendum "B", ALJ's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 11, paragraph 50.) 
7. That Mr. Felix's functional capacity evaluation did not address Mr. 
Shearer's ability to stand for an 8 hour shift on a concrete floor, nor did it 
address his limitations in bending and twisting. Those problems would 
need to be addressed with accommodations by an employer. (Rl at 227. 
See also Addendum "B", ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, page 11, paragraph 47.) 
Not only does the Commission ignore any favorable information in Mr. Evertson's 
testimony, but they also totally ignore the following glaring omissions which render his 
report of little evidentary value: 
1. There were only two jobs he could find which would be suitable for 
Petitioner, one being a convenience store clerk, and the other being a night 
watchman. (Only the night watchman position was available, however, at 
the time of the hearing). He felt that in order to work as a convenience 
store clerk, he would need an employer "that would work with him" and 
help with lifting, etc. (R. 4, Hearing transcript at 99, lines 18-25, and page 
100, lines 1-4.) 
2. In determining that Mr. Shearer could work only the two jobs, Mr. Evertsen 
admitted that he did not specifically mention all of Petitioner's limitations 
to potential employers because, "In [his] line of work if you start telling 
about all major problems he has, sometimes you shoot yourself in the foot, 
and the job doesn't come through." (R4, Hearing transcript at 77, lines 18-
23.) 
3. He would not necessarily tell potential employers of Petitioner's physical 
disabilities because that could sabotage their ability to obtain work and that 
prior to ADA going into effect, ". . . we advised our clients when they filled 
out an application that they leave those questions blank. Because as certain 
as they fill them in, that application would wind up in the round file." (R4. 
Hearing transcript at 113, lines 9-25 and page 114, lines 1-3.) 
4. Mr. Evertsen testified that, "If I were to go to an employer and say, I have a 
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back injury, and I have problems all the time, he is not going to want to hire 
me, because that's the first thing out of my mouth." (R4, Hearing transcript 
at 114, lines 17-23.) 
5. In rendering his opinion, Mr. Evertsen indicated that in determining 
whether an individual is capable of returning to work, it is generally 
necessary to determine what transferable job skills he has. In rendering his 
opinion as to Shearer's ability to find other work, Mr. Evertsen admitted 
that he made no effort to list transferable job skills which Petitioner may 
have had. (R4, Hearing transcript at 86, lines 1-20.) 
6. His entire time spent in labor market research in finding employment was 
about four hours. (R4, Hearing transcript at 88, lines 5-10.) 
7. In conducting his labor market research, and in rendering his opinion, 
Evertsen neglected to obtain even one job description. (R4, Hearing 
transcript at 90, lines 2-6.) 
8. He testified that when rendering his opinion, it was necessary to review 
medical records in making such a determination, but that he was not 
familiar with any of Petitioner's medical records, including those from: 
Cottonwood Hospital, Dixie Regional Medical Center, Kyle Landers, Dr. 
Gauffin, Hurricane Family Clinic, Dr. Kim Dee Chiropractor, Dr. Canable 
[sic], Dr. David Moore, and Dr. Tebbs, who were the majority of 
Petitioner's health care providers. (R4, Hearing transcript at 90, lines 10-
25, page 91, lines 1-25, and page 92, lines 1-15.) 
9. In rendering his opinion, Mr. Evertsen indicated that his opinion was based 
upon the medical restrictions of physical therapist, Mr. Felix, whose 
restrictions where much more stringent than those of Mr. Beck. Mr. 
Evertsen indicated that if he would have used the report of Mr. Beck as 
opposed to Mr. Felix, there would have been fewer jobs potentially 
available to Petitioner. (R4, Hearing transcript at 120 , lines 3-15). As 
noted below, the Utah Labor Commission, in its Order Denying 
Reconsideration, relied on Mr. Beck's evaluation, thereby undercutting the 
evidentiary value of Mr. Evertsen's vocational rehabilitation report. 
In short, Mr. Evertson testified that in order to find work for Mr. Shearer he would 
have to hide his limitations from the employer and intentionally evade and fail to answer 
usual and permissable inquiries from the prospective employer, although he would 
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contradictorily, require accommodations from the employer in order to keep the job. He 
was explicit that if Mr. Shearer disclosed his undisputed injuries and limitations that he 
would not be hired. 
Mr. Evertson also admitted on cross-examination that although it was necessary to 
review medical records, he had not seen the majority of Mr. Shearer's. In addition, he 
had made no effort to determine Mr. Shearer's transferable skills, and he had relied on a 
flawed functional capacity evaluation to gage Mr. Shearer's physical abilities. 
Experts called to give expert opinion must lay foundation for giving that opinion. 
Patty v. Lainhart 977 P. 2d 1193 (Utah 1999). In order for an expert to give an opinion, 
he must have personal knowledge of the facts relative to the case or must be made aware 
of those facts at the time of trial. Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad, 
683 P. 2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
Over Petitioner's objections, Mr. Evertsen testified regarding Petitioner's ability 
to find work in the open labor market. However, he did not have the requisite knowledge 
upon which to base his testimony. He offered these opinions without benefit of the 
majority of Petitioner's medical records, ignoring the physical limitations set forth by Mr. 
Beck, one of the functional capacity evaluators, and ignoring Mr. Shearer's subjective 
complaints. Mr. Evertsen admitted that if Mr. Shearer was required to lay down during 
an 8 hour day as he had testified and the Administrative Law Judge found to be fact, 
there is not one job in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles that Mr. Shearer could do. 
Mr. Evertsen also recognized that even with the two jobs he had identified, 
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Petitioner would need the assistance of a qualified vocational rehabilitation provider to 
ensure success at those jobs. Mr. Evertsen admitted that if Mr. Shearer had problems in 
his low back with the scarring and the disc fragment identified by Dr. Gaufin, it would 
cause him concern that Mr. Shearer would be able to do the two jobs he had identified. It 
is noteworthy that Respondent never supplied Mr. Evertsen with Dr. Gaufin's records to 
even review. 
The testimony of Respondent's own expert is sufficient to award benefits and 
demonstrates the Commission's misapplication of the code. The sole basis for denial of 
benefits was the Commission's determination that Petitioner could do other work 
reasonably available. The Utah Permanent Total Disability statute contemplates that if an 
injured worker is in need of vocational assistance, other work is not reasonably available 
as the remedy for an injured worker without vocational rehabilitation assistance pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii). 
IK Medical Capacity, Medical capacity is not defined by the statute, which then 
goes on to also refer to "residual functional capacity"as a separate factor to be considered. 
For the sake of clarity, Petitioner will discuss these two items as though they are separate 
considerations and discuss here only those items that go to Mr. Shearer's medical 
condition. His functional capacity, if any, will be addressed in a separate point below. 
The parties do not dispute Mr. Shearer has a significant impairment as a result of 
his industrial accident at Lin's Marketplace, in June of 1995. (Rl at 232. See also, 
Addendum "B," ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 16, 
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paragraph 42.) He has been awarded Social Security Disability benefits based on this 
work related injury. At the time of the Commission's Order denying him benefits, he was 
over 70 years old and had not worked for wages for five years. 
Perhaps best indicative of his medical capacity is Mr. Shearer's attempts to return 
to work. The Administrative Law Judge made specific findings in regards to Mr. 
Shearer's return to work efforts, noting that, "The evidence in the record indicates the 
Petitioner's desire to return to work in early 1996, despite the recommendations of Dr. 
Gaufm and Dr. Root that he cease working." (Rl at 234. See also, Addendum "B" ALJ's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 18, paragraph 2). The Utah Labor 
Commission, however, in two separate Orders failed to even once mention this significant 
evidence, even in passing. 
Following his work related injury, Mr. Shearer attempted to return to work on light 
duty in August of 1995 running the video rental counter at Lin's Marketplace. He 
operated a cash register and rented and filed video tapes. The video tapes were stored 
behind large glass or plastic doors, six to seven feet tall and four feet wide. He aggravated 
his low back injury working at the video counter and was again taken off work, but 
continued with physical therapy. (Rl at 219. See also, Addendum "B" ALJ's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 3, paragraph 6.) 
In January of 1996, Mr. Shearer again attempted to return to work as a cashier in 
the 10 Items or Less Express Check stand. However that also proved unsuccessful. Mr. 
Shearer testified that the bending, twisting, and standing for a full eight hour shift 
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associated with working at the check stand, aggravated his low back pain. After working 
for one week, he told his employer that he couldn't do that work and returned to see his 
doctor. (Rl at 220. See also, Addendum "B", the ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order, page 4, paragraph 11.) 
Mr. Shearer's son, Doug, was a partner in an antique store located in downtown St. 
George, Utah. In the fall of 1997, the Petitioner tried to help his son at antique shows and 
at the store. At antique shows, the Petitioner was unable to help his son load and unload 
the merchandise, so he talked to customers. He found that the exertion of standing and 
selling at an antique show was similar to the exertion of operating a check stand and 
aggravated his low back pain. However, the Petitioner was able to make himself a bed 
under the table and could lay down when his back started to hurt. When his son and his 
partner opened a second antique store in Bloomington, Utah, the Petitioner agreed to 
watch the St. George store for them without pay. He sat at the antique shop six days a 
week, eight hours a day for two months, although he wasn't expected to clean or stock 
and could lay down or read most of the time. After one month, the Petitioner's back 
began to greatly bother him. Business picked up, and he was unable to rest and take naps 
as he had done before. Therefore, he was forced to quit working for his son. (Rl at 224. 
See also, Addendum "B", ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 8, 
paragraph 31.) 
Based upon his prior work experience and physical conditions, Petitioner did not 
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feel there were any jobs which he had been trained for or that he had worked in the past 
which he could do at the time of the hearing. (R4, Hearing transcript at 16, lines 19-23.) 
The Commission dismisses all of Mr. Shearer's testimony as "self-serving" and 
"uncorroborated". (R2 at 428. See also Addendum "D" Order Denying Reconsideration, 
page 2, paragraph 4.) No analysis is provided for this startling declaration. The 
Administrative Law Judge, who actually observed Mr. Shearer testify twice, made a 
specific finding that he was a credible witness. (Rl at 228. See also Addendum "B", 
page 12, paragraph 51.) In the "Analysis" section of her decision, she again referred to 
Mr. Shearer as being "quite credible." (Rl at 223. See also Addendum "B", page 17, 
paragraph 2). 
Any witnesses testimony will, of course, be somewhat self-serving. The mere fact 
that a witness's testimony supports his/her claim is not any reason for rejecting or 
discounting it. A witness's interest in testifying a certain way is no greater than that of a 
paid defense expert. The Commission was unable to find any inconsistencies, 
contradictions or evasions in Mr. Shearer's testimony. 
Actually, there is no evidence that the Commission even reviewed Mr. Shearer's 
testimony, as no aspect of it is ever cited by the Commission. Indeed, at the time of the 
Commission's initial Order Granting Motion for Review, a transcript of Mr. Shearer's 
testimony was not available due to a recording error. Although the Commission entered 
an Order of Remand (R2 at 413-414) for the purpose of retaking that testimony, it never 
26 
cites the testimony and could not have relied on it as it was never fully transcribed. 
Further, Mr. Shearer's testimony, contrary to the Commission's finding, was in 
fact corroborated by his treating doctors, who all advised him to cease working and seek 
disability benefits. (Rl at 220, 223 and 234). This significant evidence is not even 
referenced by the Commission. 
While the Respondent completely overlooks the results of Mr. Shearer's actual 
attempts to work, it does place great reliance on a surveillance video which was 
surreptitiously taken by the insurance carrier. In its Order Granting Motion for Review, 
the Commission finds: "... surreptitious video recordings indicate Mr. Shearer is capable 
of relatively vigorous activity, including walking, bending, twisting and lift lifting." (R2 
at 282. See also, Addendum "C", Order Granting Motion for Review, page 2, paragraph 
5). In its subsequent Order Denying Reconsideration, the Commission found that: 
A surveillance video taken on two consecutive days in November 1998 
demonstrate his abilities to walk briskly for more than 30 minutes, lift and 
carry small items, operate a motor vehicle, twist, turn, bend, climb up and 
down from the bed of a pickup truck. Mr. Shearer did all the foregoing 
activities with no apparent pain or limitation. 
(R2 at 429. See also, Addendum "D" Order Denying Reconsideration, page 3, paragraph 
3). 
Although the surveillance video was admitted into evidence, (R3) it was not 
actually screened at the hearing. The Administrative Law Judge placed no weight on it, 
noting: 
I mean, everybody understands that these videotapes don't accurately depict 
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a day in his life, or a week in his life. You know, it's whatever the PI 
decides to - whenever the PI decides to turn the tape on. (R4 at 31, line 15-
19). 
Although the Respondent Labor Commission refers to what the video shows, they 
make no claim to having actually watched it for themselves. The Administrative Law 
Judge noted "... these videotapes are incredibly boring for the judges to have to watch." 
(R4 at 34, line 14-17). Indeed, the Commission's characterization of what the video 
shows would lead one to believe that they never actually watched it. There is scant 
activity on the tape which could properly be labeled as "vigorous." 
At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that his injuries had left him unable to do 
yard work and that there was a "conflict" over the junk in his yard. Illustrating his 
limitations, Mr. Shearer testified: "I can't mow the lawn, I can't trim my trees or my 
bushes. I can't do any of that stuff. And I certainly can't pick up stuff and haul it to the 
dump." (R4, Hearing transcript at 45-46). The videotape goes on for a period of time 
with Petitioner's sons working outside cleaning up the yard. Mr. Shearer further testified: 
That's what my boys were doing, is cleaning up my place, doing that. ...The 
only reason I was out there is they called me out to make some decisions. 
You see, we'd been working all morning long. This is what it doesn't show 
on the tape. We'd been working all morning long, they had, and I'd been in 
the house. In fact, I took a nap in there while they were doing it. And they 
called me out to make some decisions before I moved the truck, took it into 
town, they were doing that loading. 
(R4, Hearing transcript at 27-28). 
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The videotape further supports Petitioner's testimony that he is unable to do 
simple, daily tasks as the videotape shows Petitioner's son bringing firewood into the 
home as Petitioner is unable to do this relatively simple task for himself. Petitioner's sons 
do not live with him. (R4, Hearing transcript at 46, lines 19-25 and 47, lines 1-13). 
Although the Commission finds that the video shows Petitioner is able to do 
"vigorous" activities with "no apparent pain or limitation," that is not actually supported 
by the video. The video actually shows Petitioner placing his hand on his back at the area 
of his injury with a somewhat unconscious reaction which indicates he was having back 
pain. Mr. Shearer testified: 
I'm reaching with the back of my hand, wrist, and arm back there to 
massage the small - the waist, or just the lower part of the back, below the 
waist. It's subconscious - or an unconscious thing that I do when my back 
is bothering me. ... I don't even know I'm doing it. ... My back is bothering 
me. 
(R4 Hearing transcript at 29, lines 7-25). Even the Respondent's own expert 
acknowledged that the video showed Mr. Shearer reacting in pain to response to his 
activities. (R4 Hearing transcript at 29, lines 12-13). 
Thus, the overwhelming medical evidence from the doctors was to the effect that 
Mr. Shearer was incapable of working and needed to quit the workforce. It was his 
doctors who encouraged him to apply for disability benefits due to his injuries. His 
unsuccessful return to work efforts further showed that his medical condition was such 
that he could not work. Finally, the surveillance video tape is of little evidentiary value, 
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as it only showed limited activity, followed with pain. Further, there is great doubt that it 
was even actually viewed by the Commissioner. 
E. Residual Functional Capacity. The final consideration under the statute is 
that the injured worker's residual functional capacity be considered. In this regard, Mr. 
Shearer had been subject to two "functional capacity evaluations" (FCE). 
The first was on January 16, 18, and 23, of 1996, when Petitioner was evaluated by 
physical therapist, Virgil Beck. Mr. Beck concluded that the Petitioner's physical 
abilities were inconsistent with the physical requirements of his employment as a Frozen 
Food Manager and suggested that he could not physically return to that job without 
modification. 
Significant deficits identified by Mr. Beck include a nine minute sitting tolerance 
with increased pain down the right leg, hand coordination, and the Petitioner's refusal to 
try forward bent work while standing and un-weighted rotation in sitting. (R5 at 34-45. 
See also, Addendum "B," ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 6, 
paragraph 22). Mr. Beck's report notes that the Petitioner reported his symptoms were 
aggravated by lifting, sitting more than 30 minutes, driving his truck with a clutch, hiking, 
and bending activities. 
Mr. Beck concluded that the Petitioner could perform sedentary work. Sedentary 
work was defined as exerting up to 10 pounds offeree occasionally, or up to one-third of 
the time, and exerting a negligible amount of force frequently, or one-third to two-thirds 
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of the time. According to Mr. Beck, "Sedentary work includes sitting most of the time, 
but may involve walking or standing for brief periods of time. Jobs are sedentary if 
walking and standing are required occasionally and all other sedentary criteria are met." 
(R5 at 34-45. See also, Addendum "B", ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, page 5, paragraph 19). 
A second functional capacity evaluation was performed on May 14, 1999, at the 
request of the insurance carrier, by physical therapist, Dell Felix, who concluded that Mr. 
Shearer could perform work at a "medium physical demand work level." (Rl). 
At best, functional capacity evaluations are snapshot measurements of the 
individual's ability to perform certain functions on a given day. None of the evaluations 
in this case measured activities over more than a full day. Nor was either evaluator able 
to see even the short term effects that their "tests" had on Mr. Shearer. 
Approximately one to three days after being evaluated by Mr. Beck, Petitioner's 
back pain increased. He testified that the first functional capacity evaluation "put him 
down" for several weeks with the onset of low back pain shortly after the FCE. He was 
only able to obtain relief by sleeping on the floor. (Rl at 222. See also, Addendum "B", 
ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 9, paragraph 23). 
The Petitioner testified that the second FCE, by Dell Felix, caused the onset of 
pain a few days after the evaluation. However, sleeping on the floor and decreasing his 
activity level did not provide relief in the same manner as before. (Rl at 225. See also, 
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Addendum "B", ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, page 9, 
paragraph 38). 
The Administrative Law Judge summed up the functional capacity evaluations by 
noting: 
Therefore, although the Petitioner may be able to do certain types of 
physical activities on a cgood day,' the evidence does not show that the 
Petitioner can continue to perform work activities of even a sedentary 
nature on a consistent basis. The functional capacity evaluations, although 
they measured the Petitioner's physical capabilities over a short period of 
time, cannot accurately reflect the Petitioner's ability to work on a 
consistent basis, i.e. eight hours a day five days a week. 
(Rl. at 233, See also, Addendum "B" ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, page 17, paragraph 4). 
In its initial Order Granting Motion for Review, the Commission found as follows: 
"... his most recent functional capacity evaluation indicates he is capable of moderate 
activity." (R2 at 282. See also, Addendum "C," Order Granting Motion for Review, 
page 2, paragraph 5). No reference is made to Mr. Beck's evaluation, nor was there any 
analysis of the two evaluations. Petitioner raised this defect in his Motion for 
Reconsideration. In its Order Denying Reconsideration, the Commission cited both 
reports and the surveillance video to find ". . . Mr. Shearer is physically capable of work 
activities at least as strenuous as described in Mr. Beck's functional capacity evaluation." 
(R2 at 429. See also, Addendum "D," Order Denying Reconsideration, page 3, paragraph 
4). 
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This resulted in a reversal of the Commission's earlier finding that in reliance on 
Mr. Felix's FCE, Mr. Shearer could do medium physical demand level work, and in a 
new finding, hat he was only capable of "sedentary" work. The vocational evaluation of 
Mr. Evertson, however, is based on jobs in excess of the sedentary demand level. The 
Commission's Order Denying Reconsideration adopting Mr. Beck's evaluation 
completely undercuts the evidentiary value of the vocational rehabilitation report. 
The two functional capacity evaluations differ, but the Commission, after being 
forced to weigh the two opinions, ultimately found that Mr. Shearer could do sedentary 
work. Even that finding is undercut by Mr. Shearer's aggravated condition following the 
FCEs, and his actual unsuccessful attempts to return to even sedentary work. As the 
Administrative Law Judge noted, the FCEs cannot accurately reflect the Petitioner's 
ability to work on a consistent basis of eight hours a day, five days a week. Mr. Shearer's 
good faith attempts to return to work demonstrate 
that he could not. 
Ill 
THE LABOR COMMISSION INCORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH CODE ANN, 
§34A-2-423 AS IT APPLIES TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
In denying Petitioner benefits, the Labor Commission concludes that Petitioner 
had failed to meet one element of his claim for permanent total disability benefits. The 
Commission found that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv), Petitioner had 
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failed to show that he was unable to perform other work reasonably available, taking into 
consideration his age, education, past work experience, medical capacity and residual 
functional capacity. 
The testimony of Respondent's own expert is sufficient to award benefits and 
demonstrates the Commission's misapplication of the code. The sole basis for denial of 
benefits was the Commission's determination that Petitioner could do other work 
reasonably available. The Utah permanent total disability statute contemplates that if an 
injured worker is in need of vocational assistance, other work is not reasonably available 
as the remedy for an injured worker without vocational rehabilitation assistance pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii). 
In this case, Respondent's expert testified that Mr. Shearer would need vocational 
rehabilitation assistance in order to access the labor market because of his disability. 
Specifically, Mr. Evertson, the vocational rehabilitation specialist, noted that since Mr. 
Shearer has difficulty in twisting, it would be appropriate for him to have competent 
vocational rehabilitation counseling. (R4, Hearing transcript at page 136, lines 3-8.) The 
Commission completely ignored the uncontro verted evidence that if Mr. Shearer were to 
return to gainful employment, he would require vocational rehabilitation assistance. 
Petitioner is simply asking for a tentative finding of permanent total disability so 
Respondent can begin its rehabilitation process if it so desires. As Respondent's own 
expert acknowledges, Petitioner is in need of vocational rehabilitation assistance as work 
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is not reasonably available to Shearer. To hold otherwise would totally eviscerate Utah 
Code Ann. §34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii), as there would never be a need to provide vocational 
rehabilitation assistance. 
The Respondent, Utah Labor Commission, had adopted Administrative Rule 
R612-1-10, dealing with the procedure to be applied to claims for permanent total 
disability compensation. R612-1-10 (C) (2) provides that after a tentative preliminary 
finding of permanent total disability, "an additional inquiry must be made into the 
applicant's ability to be reemployed or rehabilitated, unless the parties waive such 
additional proceedings." The ALJ is to hold a hearing to consider whether an applicant 
can be reemployed or rehabilitated. At this hearing, the employer or insurance carrier 
may submit a reemployment plan. If, after the second hearing, the ALJ concludes that 
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the ALJ shall then enter a final order for 
continuing payment of permanent total disability compensation. 
The failure to award Petitioner permanent total disability compensation, or the 
failure to hold a hearing to determine if he can be reemployed violates state statute and 
the Labor Commission's own rule governing cases such as this. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Petitioner respectfully requests that the final agency action in Mr. Shearer's case 
be reversed and remanded with directions that Mr. Shearer be awarded permanent total 
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disability benefits as a result of his industrial injury, or in alternative, the case be 
remanded with directions that the Commission enter a Tentative Finding of Permanent 
Total Disability and enable Respondent's to proceed with a vocational rehabilitation plan, 
should they so desire. 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2002 
fF07<?& &=><£ 
Aaron J. Prisprey 
Counsel for Hetitione\ Gordon! 
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Addendum A 
Determinative Statutes 
-413. Permanent total disability - Amount of payments -
ulitation. 
(a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an 
trial accident or occupational disease, the employee shall receive 
nsation as outlined m this section. 
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability 
nsation, the employee has the burden of proof to show by a 
mderance of evidence that: 
the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of 
rments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational 
tse that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
1) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct 
> of the employee's permanent total disability. 
To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission 
conclude that: 
the employee is not gainfully employed; 
) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that 
the employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
1) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or 
nation of impairments prevent the employee from performing the 
ltial functions of the work activities for which the employee has 
qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational 
tse that is the basis for the employee's permanent total disability 
i; and 
r) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, 
lg into consideration the employee's age, education, past work 
"ience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other 
those provided under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
ise Act, if relevant, may be presented to the commission, but is not 
mg and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 
veek entitlement, compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's 
age weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average 
Ly wage at the time of the injury; 
compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child 
- the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent minor 
iren, but not exceeding the maximum establisned in Subsection (2) (a) 
exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the 
:y; and 
) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate 
c Subsection (2)(b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly 
, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of 
m the course of the employee's employment on or before June 30, 
The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 
L ^ wt^^b 01 permanent total disability compensation except as outlined 
i Section 34A-2-7D3 a^ in pffpr-t- on -t-ho H^te of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
Dispensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided 
i this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 
1A-2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of compensation 
lyable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
sability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the 
iployer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and 
lall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the 
iployee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's 
iployer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for 
y combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at 
e applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the 
ployers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total 
sability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately 
ter the employer or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability 
der Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of 
d in the course of the employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent 
tal disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
npensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided 
this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 
\-2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of compensation 
/able over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
saoility compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the 
Dloyer or its insurance carrier by reasonably offsetting the 
srpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312 
*s<LS . 
5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), 
1
 compensation payable by the employer, its insurance carrier, or the 
)loyers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation 
)m the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable 
al disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent 
owable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security 
irement benefits received by the employee during the same period. 
6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is 
final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until: 
l) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment 
lvities undertaken pursuant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker 
mployment Act; 
n ) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the 
mistrative law judge a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified 
abilitation provider reasonably designed to return the employee to 
nful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier provides the 
mistrative law judge notice that the employer or its insurance 
rier will not submit a plan; and 
i n ) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds 
ring, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding 
llitation and to review any reemployment plan submitted by the 
yer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6) (a) (11) . 
Prior to the finding becoming final, the administrative law judge 
order: 
the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments 
ovide for the employee's subsistence; and 
) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due 
mployee. 
The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for 
lisability payments made under Subsection (6)(b) against its ultimate 
llity compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
ational Disease Act. 
An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit 
mployment plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier 
tarily submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(d)(I) 
gh (in) . 
The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability 
nsation benefits, 30b placement services, or incentives calculated 
cilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its insurance 
er. 
) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability 
nsation to provide for the employee's subsistence during the 
llitation process. 
1) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue 
eemployment plan. The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to 
ently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the 
istrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own motion to 
a final decision of permanent total disability. 
If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful 
>ilitation is not possible, the administrative law judge shall order 
the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation 
its. 
(a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee 
le permanently totally disabled, as determined by a final order of 
ommission based on the facts and evidence, and ends: 
with the death of the employee; or 
) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady 
An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a 
nently totally disabled employee reasonable, medically appropriate, 
time work in a job earning at least minimum wage provided that 
)yment may not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the 
>yee from Social Security disability benefits. 
An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment 
ss and accept the reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work. 
In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income 
the work provided under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer 
isurance carrier may reduce the employee's permanent total disability 
nsation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of $500. 
If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its 
ance carrier, a permanently totally disabled employee may obtain 
^dically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset provisions 
mtamed in Subsection (/) (a) . 
(f) (1) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time 
)rk and offset. 
(11) The adjudication of disputes arising under Subsection (7) is 
)verned by Part 8, Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of 
oof to show that medically appropriate part-time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(I) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would 
quire the employee to undertake work exceeding the employee's medical 
pacity and residual functional capacity or for good cause; or 
(II) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent 
tal disability benefits as provided in Subsection (7)(d) when 
asonable, medically appropriate, part-time employment has been offered 
t the employee has failed to fully cooperate. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's 
habilitation is possible but the employee has some loss of bodily 
nction, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not 
titled to disability compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates 
th any evaluation or reemployment plan under this chapter or Chapter 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall 
smiss without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the 
ninistrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fuliy 
Dperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific findings 
the record justifying dismissal with prejudice. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both 
ids, both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of 
D such body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be 
npensated according to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection 
)) (a) is final. 
11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically 
examine a permanent total disability claim, except those based on 
)section (10), for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or 
> payment responsibility to determine whether the worker remains 
manently totally disabled. 
b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years 
er an award is final, unless good cause is shown by the employer or 
insurance carrier to allow more frequent reexaminations. 
c) The reexamination may include: 
l) the review of medical records; 
n ) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations; 
m ) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and 
raining efforts; 
IV) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns; 
v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and 
vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires 
)ved by the division. 
The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a 
imination with appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to rule 
easonable travel allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert 
'ss fees incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's claim 
>ermanent total disability benefits at the time of reexamination. 
It an employee tails to tull_y cooperate in the reasonable 
immation of a permanent total disability finding, an administrative 
udge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent total 
>ility benefits until the employee cooperates with the 
ruination. 
(1) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability 
ng reveal evidence that reasonably raises the issue of an employee's 
nued entitlement to permanent total disability compensation 
its, an insurer 01 self-insured employer may petition the Division 
[judication for a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be 
ipanied by documentation supporting the insurer's or self-insured 
>yerfs belief that the employee is no longer permanently totally 
.led. 
) If the petition under Subsection (11) [f)(i) demonstrates gooa 
, as determined by the Division of Adjudication, an administrative 
udge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing. 
i) Evidence of an employee's participation m medically 
priate, part-time work may not be the sole basis for termination ot 
iployee's permanent total disability entitlement, but the evidence of 
mployee's participation m medically appropriate, part-time work 
Subsection (7) may be considered in the reexamination or hearing 
other evidence relating to the employee's status and condition. 
In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge 
ward reasonable attorneys fees to an attorney retained by an 
yee to represent the employee's interests with respect to 
ruination of the permanent total disability finding, except if the 
yee does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. 
ttorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance carrier 
dition to the permanent total disability compensation benefits due. 
During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee 
coopeiates, each insurer, self-insured employer, or the Employers' 
urance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total disability 
nsation benefits due the employee. 
) If any provision of this section, or the application ot any 
sion to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of 
section shall be given effect without the invalid provision or 
cation. 
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AND ORDER 
!i 
October 20, 1999 al 9 00 a.m bv Order and Notice et the Labor 
Commission, 
I 5 e t o r e : Sharon , I, Eblen, Admin listrative Law Judge 
Appearances: Petitioner Goidon Shearer was represented by Aaron 
Prisbrey., A - — • v •
 ;1W< 
Respondents Lin's Market Place and Great American 
Insurance represented by Thomas Sturdy, Attorney at Law. 
Petitioner was injured in the course and scope of his ei nployn lent wit! i 
I ii V's Market Place on June 23, 1995. He now claims that he is pen nar lei itly ai id 
totally disabled as a rest ill: of his industrial accident. The parties dispute whether 
tl i B\ e is work reasonably available to the Petitioner that is consistent with his 
pi i> sical limitations. 
At the hearing, the Petitionei objected to the testimony of Respondent's 
vocational expert: for lack of foundation under State vs Rimmasch, 775 P. 2 d 
388 (Utah 1989). Petitioner also objected to certain hearsay in the vocational 
expert's report. At the hearing, Petitioner objected to exhibit R-2, on the basis 
that it may have been edited. By letter on November 4,1999, Mr. Sturdy and 
former Mr. Prisbrey that the videotape in question was not edited, but was a 
duplicate of the original tape. 
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Although the Respondent's answer to the application for hearing raised 
the issue of medical causation, there is no medical evidence to show a medical 
dispute regarding the medical causal connection between the Petitioners 
industrial accident and his low back pain. The only issue argued at the hearing 
was whether there was work reasonably available to the Petitioner given his 
physical limitations, age, education and work experience. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Petitioner, Gordon Shearer, was injured in the course and scope of 
his employment with Lin's Marketplace, a grocery store located in 
Hurricane, Utah. The Petitioner worked as the Frozen Food Manager for 
the market. He began working for Lin's Marketplace in May 1988 as the 
Frozen Food and Dairy Manager. His duties included ordering and 
stocking merchandise in the frozen food and dairy sections of the market. 
The Petitioner described the work as 90% stocking merchandise. 
2. On the date of the accident, the Petitioner was earning an average 
weekly wage of $337.25. He was a widower and had no dependent 
children under age eighteen. This translates to a compensation rate of 
$225 per week. 
3. The Petitioner had a history of prior back problems related to his 
employment with Lins as well as his prior employment with the National 
Park Service. In November 1987, the Petitioner injured his low back lifting 
tubs of apples at Pipe Springs National Monument. In September 1988, 
the Petitioner strained his low back again unloading trucks of frozen food 
at Lins Marketplace. In February 1989, the Petitioner again strained his 
low back lifting cases of milk at Lin's Market Place. In September 1989, 
the Petitioner again strained his back unloading at truck of milk and 
frozen foods lifting 40 to 50 cases weighing about 60 lbs. each. In August 
1991, the Petitioner again injured his low back while unloading at truck at 
Lins Marketplace. On October 14, 1992, the Petitioner aggravated his low 
back while leaning over filling a case with 12 oz cans of juice. There 
were additional low back strains in December 1992 and May 1993. In 
May 1994, the Petitioner injured his left hip when he fell off his bicycle. 
Inactivity due to his hip fracture seemed to aggravate his low back pain. 
He returned to work from his hip injury in August 1994. 
4. On June 23, 1995, the Petitioner was moving a pallet of frozen food on a 
pallet jack. Another pallet with three to four cases of juice, was in the way 
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 x,
~" Peti t ioner squat ted and reached d o w n to lift and drag the pallet 
out of the way. The Petitioner estimated that the pallet with the juice cans 
weighed between 10 and 15 lbs. he dragged the pallet 3 to 4 ft. and felt a 
pain in his low and mid back. He reported the accident and went home 
immediately after the accident. 
AXt
—
 XLie accident, the Petitioner developed pain in his right hip and leg. 
He sought chiropractic care with Dr. Nile Kennedy on June 2 6 , 1 9 9 5 and 
received treatments from him until August 4, 1995. On August 1, 1995, 
the Petitioner was examined by Dr. Max Root, a physiatrist in St. George , 
Utah w h o released him to return to work with permanent light dutjr 
s (MR p 120). Dr. Root also recommended a course of 
pnysical therapy. 
! he Petitioner received temporary total disability benefits until he 
attempted to return to work in August 1995 running the video rental 
C O U P ; • MI ..=••;. Marketplace. He operated a cash register, rented and 
f i led v ideo tapes. The video tapes we re s tored behind large glass or 
plastic doors, six to seven feet tall and four feet wide. The Petitioner 
aggravated his low back injury working at the video counter and was 
aga in taken off work, but cont inued wi th physical therapy 
i On Augus t 30, 1995, Petit ioner received a • * y*< ' spine at 
Dixie Regie i iiall I" ledical Center, "! br * * a to snovv a " focal 
right paramidline herniated nucleus puiposus with possible free fragment 
at L 5-S 1 which displaces the right S1 nerve root" On September 2 
1995, Petitioner saw Dr. Muirfor review of the M R I and treatment 
options. Dr. Muir diagnosed a herniated disk at L 5-S 1 with significant 
imp ingement of the S1 nerve root. 
IDi , Muir performed a iaminotoi i ly, foraminotomy, d iscectomy on the right 
at L 5-S1 on September 8, 1995. In follow-up with Dr. Root on September 
25 , 1995, the Petitioner reported immedia te relief from the surgery. 
Unfortunately, however, he had an aggravat ing ep isode while at tempt ing 
to open the door of a bank which s e e m e d to jar his low back, and then a 
tripping episode which also seemed to aggravate his back. The 
Petitioner was complaining of" periodic numbness and pain down his r ight 
leg as previously and is concerned that he may have re-herniated his disc. 
" Dr, Root recommended he fol low i jp with Dr Mi lir. 
n T h e Petitioner noted an ir item littent severe pain that would I lappen on 
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occasion when jolts while walking or back movements would cause a 
sudden, pinching sensation and severe pain, 10 on a scale of 1 to 10, with 
10 being the greatest pain. 
10. In follow-up with Dr. Muir on September 30, 1995, Dr. Muir took a "wait 
and see " attitude regarding the setback to Petitioners progress. In 
November 1995 the Petitioner's condition continued to improve, and Dr. 
Muir recommended he begin physical therapy. 
11. In January 1996 the Petitioner again attempted a return to work as a 
cashier in the 10 Items or Less Express Check Stand. The Petitioner 
testified that the bending, twisting, and standing for a full 8 hour shift 
associated with working at the check stand, aggravated his low back pain. 
After working for one week, the Petitioner told his employer that he 
couldn't do this work and returned to see his doctor. 
12. On January 6, 1995, the Petitioner returned to Dr. Muir. Although he was 
not having the same amount of pain he had prior to surgery, he was 
complaining of back pain at work with bending to remove items from 
shopping carts. The Petitioner felt that he could not tolerate the repeated 
bending associated with his employment duties. Dr. Muir felt Petitioner's 
problems were in the facet joints. Rather than undergo another surgery, 
Dr. Muir recommended that the Petitioner take early-retirement. 
13. The Petitioner has not worked for wages since January 5, 1996. 
14. The Petitioner applied for Social Security Disability benefits in January 
1996. He applied for S S I when his wife passed away, and had to wait 
six months before benefits started. When he got hurt again after he 
returned to work, the Petitioner decided to go ahead and apply for Social 
Security because of the waiting period. The Petitioner received an award 
of Security Disability benefits of $665.20 per month effective in January 
1996. 
15. The Petitioner testified that he did not want to retire, but had planned to 
continue working until he was 70 years old, and then to work 12 to 18 
antique shows a year until he reached age 75. At the time of the hearing, 
the Petitioner was 68 years old. In June 1995, he was 64 years old. At 
the time of his accident, the Petitioner had applied for employment at a 
convenience store and Shell gas station, and was waiting for a job 
opening. 
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16. The Petitioner testified that the exertion of setting up displays of 
merchandise and lo standing and selling merchandise, aggravated his low 
-y pain. 
11 i fie petitioner's pain starts in I lis low back and goes down into his i igl it . 
leg. The pain in his low back scares him and he feels like the doctors 
won't talk to him about it. The Petitioner explained that the best positions 
foi relieving his pain were standing and laying dowi i. It I M jrts him to sit, 
particularly if he has to lean forward in the chair. If he is working at a table 
or at the sink washing dishes, he likes to either kneel or stand, but is 
careful about leaning forward, because it causes a " spasm of pain . " 
However, he has good days and bad days, and he can, of course, do 
more on a good day. 
18. On January 12, 1996, the Petitioner returned to see Ur, Root to discuss 
his back pain. The Petitioner was concerned that Dr. Muir recommended 
he take early retirement. He indicated to Dr. Root that he wanted to 
continue working at what ever capacity was safe for him. Dr. Root 
encouraged the Petitioner to obtain a functional capacity evaluation. 
19. On January 16, 18, and _ , (996, Petitioner was evaluated by physical 
therapist, Virgil Beck. Mr. Beck concluded that the Petitioner's physical 
abilities were inconsistent with the physical requirements of his 
employment as a Frozen Food Manager and suggested that he could not 
physically a return to that job without modification, Mr. Beck concluded 
that the Petitioner could perform sedentary work. Sedentary work was 
defined as exerting up to 10 libs, of force occasionally, or up to one-third of 
the time, and exerting a negligible amount of force frequently, or one-third 
to two-thirds of the time. According to Mr. Beck," Sedentary wod* 
includes sitting most of the time, but may involve walking or standing 
brief periods of time. Jobs aire sedentary if walking and standing are 
required occasionally and all other sedentary criteria are met," 
20. 1 he functional capacity evaluation performed by Virgil Beck in January 
1996 listed the Petitioners complaints as: Il • :> ::: \ istant central low back; 
and bilateral sacroiliac pain, 2. right poster ii ::: i till fig I i pain, and 3. Pain is 
neither getting better or worse, but staying static in its intensity. Mr. Beck' 
s report notes that Mr. Shearer reported his symptoms were aggravated 
by lifting, sitting more than 30 minutes, driving his truck with a clutch, 
hiking and bending activities. His symptoms were eased somewhat by 
lying down and resting. Mr. Shearer reported that he can walk up to 1 mi. 
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or one hour a day and perform some exercises he learned from his 
physical therapist; he also reported that he lives with his son and has 
assistance with some household activities. In addition, the Petitioner 
reported being placed on a 30 lb. lifting restriction prior to his last release 
to return to work. All Waddell Symptom Magnification indicators were 
negative, and his low back pain Owestry and Disability scores were in the 
52nd percentile and 56th percentile which correlates to "severe 
disability." 
21. Although Mr Beck found the Petitioner generally cooperative, he felt the 
Petitioner limited himself unnecessarily by refusing to attempt forward 
bent work in standing and unweighted rotation in sitting. Petitioner lifted 
45 lbs from floor to waist one time; lift a 23 lbs from waist to shoulder one 
time; carried 50 lbs at waist height a distance of 4 ft. 5 times; pushed a 
200 lb. cart 30 ft. one time; pull a cart weighing 170 lbs. backwards 30 ft.; 
stand for 30 minutes; walk at a normal pace on a treadmill for eight 
minutes; squat 20 times; ascend and descend a flight of stairs for 100 
steps; safely ascend and descend a stepladder for 30 steps in five trips; 
and ambulate were and balance on a balance beam for three patterns 
with 5 errors. 
22. Significant deficits identified by Mr. Beck were a nine minute sitting 
tolerance with increased pain down the right leg; hand coordination; the 
Petitioner's refusal to try forward bent work while standing and unweighted 
rotation in sitting. Mr. Beck concluded that the Petitioner was capable of 
performing sedentary work. Based upon his understanding that the 
Petitioners employment at Lins Marketplace required lifting 50 lbs from 
floor to waist and 40 lbs. above the shoulder, sitting 45 minutes per week, 
standing constantly, kneeling squatting crouching climbing walking 
distances greater than one-quarter mile and working over to, Mr. Beck 
concluded that the Petitioner was not physically compatible with his 
employment at Lin's Marketplace. (MR Exhibit at Tab 17). 
23. The Petitioner testified that the first functional capacity evaluation "put him 
down" for several weeks with the onset of low back pain shortly after the 
FCE. 
24. During his first functional capacity evaluation, the Petitioner testified that 
walking and carrying weight caused his back to hurt, but standing did not 
hurt. Approximately one to three days after performing the functional 
capacity evaluation, the Petitioner's back pain increased. When his pain 
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increased, he started leaning to the left and his belly started sticking out 
towards the left. The Petitioner's understanding is that he has scoliosis of 
the spine. Petitioner found relief from the low back pain by sleeping on 
the floor. 
In follow up with Dr. Root on heuiuaiy y, i»d6, it was noted that the facet 
injections recently administered by Dr. Root did not provide significant 
relief. Further, the functional capacity evaluation determined that 
Petitioner was unable to perform more than sedentary work. Dr. Root 
concurred in the Petitioner's decision to apply for Social Security Disability 
benefits 
On February 2b, "«d9t>, Dr. Root assigned a 10% w. ..<, pc; 
impairment rating for the Petitioner's herniated disc, stabili; 
surgery, with or without persistent symptoms remaining -ut signs of 
radiculopathy lliis impairment rating was calculated based upon Utah's 
1997 li I ipairmei it Guides. 
in April 1996 the Petitioner contir lued to complair i o1 ' low back paii i, 
although he felt better than he did before his surgery. Dr. Root advised 
the Petitioner to discontinue exercises or activities that cause him. pain or 
discomfort. Due to the Petitioner's concern that his condition was 
deteriorating, Dr. Root recommended additional X-rays. The X-rays 
~
u
~w^H no significant change from X-rays taken 9 to 10 months earlier. 
28. AI - .,iry 8, 1997, Dr. Teblbs referred the Petitioner to Dir. Gaufin for 
•.K2/ ". • of his continuing pain complaints Dr. Gaufin examined the 
oner and reviewed his X-rays. "His impression was chronic failed 
back syndrome. Dr. Gaufin recommended an M R I scan in an attempt to 
distinguish between a re-herniation and scartissi le. 
29. • i January 2t -umoar spine M >•? \ ^as performed at Dixie 
,i. • ; \!'-!icai Cente" P 1 was read to show " abnormal soft 
tissui . in a right paramidline location surrounding the right 81 noiv 
n^+ There is no evidence of a recurrent disc herniation. " 
30. The Petitioner retui ned to see Pi Gaufin with his new M R II Dr. Gaufin 
felt the M R I showed either scarring or a recurrent disc fragment. Dr 
Gaufin recommended that the Petitioner try to live with his symptoms and 
to avoid " real heavy lifting." Dr. Gaufin also recommended that the 
Petitioner use anti-inflammatory medications. 
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31. The Petitioner's son, Doug, was a partner in an antique store located in 
downtown St. George, Utah. In the fall of 1997, the Petitioner tried to 
help his son at antique shows and at the store. At antique shows, the 
Petitioner was unable to help his son load and unload the merchandise, 
so he talked to customers. He found that the exertion of standing and 
selling at an antique show was similar to the exertion of operating a check 
stand, and aggravated his low back pain. However, the Petitioner was 
able to make himself a bed under the table, and could lay down when his 
back started to hurt. When his son and his partner opened a second 
antique store in Bloomington, Utah, the Petitioner agreed to watch the St. 
George store for them without pay. He sat at the antique shop six days a 
week, eight hours a day for two months, although he wasn't expected to 
clean or stock and could lay down or read most of the time. After one 
month, the Petitioner's back began to bother him more often. Business 
picked up and he was unable to rest and take naps as he had done 
before, so the Petitioner quit working for his son. 
32. Prior to his 1995 accident, the Petitioner was physically active, he hiked, 
bicycled, rappelled, and used a metal detector. He also played the 12 
string guitar, mountain dulcimer, and five string banjo. He recently began 
playing banjo again because he can do that while standing. Petitioner no 
longer rides a bicycle because he cannot safely twist his back to look for 
traffic behind him. 
33. On May 14, 1999, the Respondents referred the Petitioner to Dell Felix for 
a functional capacity evaluation. Mr. Felix concluded that the Petitioner 
was capable of working in a medium physical demand work level, with 
frequent lifts of 50 lbs and occasional carrying up to 35 lbs. 
34. A second functional capacity evaluation was performed by Dell Felix on 
May 14, 1999. Mr. Felix1 report is contained in exhibit R-1. According to 
the report, the Petitioner described his current complaints as " occasional 
pain in his lower back and into his right hip. He describes that a simple 
incident such as catching his foot on a very small crack in the floor might 
cause him extreme pain for an instant. Trying to keep up with his boys on 
an arduous hike might also cause some discomfort for a few days. He 
reported that the needs to keep his hands in front of him while working 
and he needs to avoid twisting." 
35. Mr. Felix noted that the Petitioner sat for 30 minutes during his intake 
interview with two or three standing up breaks; he could stand for 12 
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-•Mil;••...' •••. -..-re plactj or 60 minutes with repeated activities; I le can walk 
'o--1 •••• -:)r: t:u? treadmill and 30 minutes and walked out side over varied 
terrain jumping down a 3 ft. embankment without a problem; he walked 
up and down two flights of stairs, and had no problems even when 
carrying 25 lbs. up and down the stairs; he could reach over head and use 
his shoulders, he could stoop, bend, and kneel, although he avoids 
twisting. 
36. There were inconsistencies seen in maximum and rapid grip strengtii 
testing, with rapid grip strength exceeding the maximum grip strength 
measured with the left hand. In Isometric lifting, the Petitioner was able to 
lift a 47.8 lbs. with his arms, 20.7 lbs. with the high far lift, 58 lbs. with the 
high near lift, and 132 lbs, with the leg left. Petitioner lifted 30 lbs. from 
the floor with his right and left arms, lifted a 50 lb. box from the floor "~ 
times in 20 minutes, carried 35 lb. dumbbell for 40 ft. then carried a 2 
dumbbell up and down stairs and 100 ft. Petitioner was able to push or 
pull a cart using 25 lbs. offeree, was slower than average on manual 
dexterity tests, and completed an obstacle course involving lifting and 
lowering a 10 lb dumbbell, lifting a 50 lb. box two times, pulling a cart 10 
ft. and carrying a 10 lb. tray for 40 ft. the Petitioner's validity tests showed 
he gave a sincere effort with the exception of grip strength of his left hand. 
37. • Based upon his evaluation, Mr. Felix concluded that the Petitioner meets 
the physical requirements of a medium physical demand work level with 
the ability to carry a maximum of 35 lbs and lift a maximum of 50 lbs. He 
was noted to use good body mechanics with lifting and carrying. He was 
never observed sitting for more than 30 minutes. 
38. The Petitioner testified that the second K;t much like the first one, 
caused the onset of pain a few days after the evaluation. However, 
sleeping on the floor and decreasing his activity level r* * • -' : ^ ^ " ^ f 
in the same manner as before. 
39. I v 1999, the Respondent retained Dirk Evertsen :i vocational 
r '' provider,, to assist the Petitioner in ret^^ing to g^nt: J 
e ant. 
40. Mr. Everts has beer i a Rehabilitation com iselor for almost 33 years I le 
received a bachelor's degree in history fron i the University of Utah in 
1968, and a master's degree in educational psychology and rehabilitation 
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counseling, also from the University of Utah, in 1969. Mr. Evertsen 
worked as a rehabilitation counselor for the State of Utah Division of 
Rehabilitation Services from August 1966 to June of 1987. After leaving 
his employment with the State of Utah , Mr. Evertsen continued to work as 
a Rehabilitation consultant up until the present time. (Respondent's 
Exhibit # 3). 
41. As part of the rehabilitation assistance provided to the Petitioner, Mr. 
Evertsen conducted a two-hour interview of Mr. Shearer, and two hours of 
testing designed to measure Mr. Shearer's aptitude, interests and 
susceptibility to retraining. 
42. Mr. Evertsen reviewed Mr. Shearer's work history, which was also 
reviewed at the hearing. Prior to his employment with Lins Marketplace, 
the Petitioner worked for the U.S. Forest Service from 1971 to 1978. 
When he began working for the Forest Service he worked in the field then 
later transferred to an office position . His job title was Resource 
Assistant, and the job was clerical in nature. The Petitioner typed timber 
sale and land-use permits, and grazing leases. 
43. The Petitioner also worked in maintenance for the National Park Service 
at Pipe National Monument in Arizona ; the night shift at the Shell Minit 
Mart, which involved working as a cashier as well as stocking the walk in 
cooler; working as a bookkeeper for four businesses in Kamas, Utah; 
retail sales management with J.C. Penney Co.; banking; vending machine 
sales; light assembly; insurance sales; and working in dairy and frozen 
foods at grocery stores in Jackson, Wyoming and in Cedar City, Utah. 
ThePetitioner was a scout, sniper and received radio training in the Army. 
44. ThPetitioner is a high-school graduate and completed two years at 
St^n Henniger Business College in accounting and management, but 
reeved no degree. 
45. Mj^rtsen testified that he reviewed the two functional capacity 
ations performed"in May 1999 January 1996, and spoke to Mr. Felix 
Ir. Beck by telephone. Mr. Evertsen noted that in his opinion, Mr. 
[erwas in good physical condition, noting that Mr. Shearer 
istrated a Karate kick with his leg fully extended above horizontal. 
46. ^e r tsen contacted a number of local employers and the local Job 
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Service Office in the St Geoi ge ai id I lurricane, Uta:. J..- *,\-—tfrn 
Utah in May 1999. As a result of his inquiries, Mr. Everts . ~ - _ 
that employment for the Petitioner was-available at Lins Marketplace, 
several convenience stores and motels ii i the area, and as a night 
watchman in a group home. Mr. Evertsen testified that based upon the 
results of the functional capacity evaluation performed by Mr. Felix, that 
Mr. Shearer was physically capable of performing medium duty work, 
which involves lifting more than 50 lbs, although he recognized that Mr. 
Shearer should probably limit his job search to sedentary to light duty 
jobs. 
y r ^ v e r | s e n a c |<n o w |e c |ge c | ^a t Mr. Felix" FCE does not address Mr. 
Shearer's ability to stand for an 8 hour shift on a concrete floor, or his 
limitations in bending and twisting. However, Mr. Evertsen fell v 
problems could be addressed wit! i accommodations by the employ -
48. Mr. Evertsen narrowed his job search based upon Mr. Shearer's 
education, transferable skills, and physical capabilities. Mr. Evertsen did 
not prepare a list of transferable job skills and he did not obtain specific 
job descriptions for the positions he identified. Mr. Evertsen reviewed the 
medical records of Dr Mi lii , Dr. Root, and the two functional capacity 
evaluations. Mr. Evertsen did not review the records of Dr. Beck, Dr. 
Gaufin, Cottonwood Medical Center, Dixie Regional Medical Center or 
radiographs. Mr. Evertsen also talked to Mr. Shearer about his limitations 
that would affect his ability to return to work. With regard to job 
descriptions, Mr. Evertsen obtained information directly from each 
employer which is typical'in the vocational rehabilitation industry. Mr. 
Evertsen then tried to tailor his job search to' Mr. Shearer's abilities 
i". r,-, _i„,Lfij i-ientifio-u L,> * vertsen, oi i lythei light 
• n.chman pos-. i-ned open as of the day of the hearing Mi 
Evertsen opined that Mr Shearer's barriers to employment were his self 
perception of his abilities, and possibly his age and hearing deficits. Mr. 
Evertsen conceded that Mr. Shearer might require accommodations in 
order to perform some of the positions he has identified 
50. Lins Marketplace has not offered Mi SI learer employment since he quit 
working as an express lane checker on January 5, 1996. According to 
Mr, Evertsen, the manager of Lin's Marketplace indicated that Mr. Shearer 
would have to reapply for positions at Lin's dile to the length of time he 
has been t memployed. 
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51. Mr. Shearer was a credible witness. 
52. As indicated in its answer, the Respondent has paid $5,800 in temporary 
total disability benefits, $6,240 in permanent partial disability benefits and 
$14,182.88 in medical expenses. According to the Form 122 filed with the 
Labor Commission on July 25, 1995, benefits were paid based upon a 
compensation rate of $200 per week. 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401 provides that only those injuries which arise out of and 
in the course of employment are compensable under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. The burden is on the Petitioner to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was injured in a compensable industrial 
accident. Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979). 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in 
dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not limited to 
the following: 
(a) depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings; 
(b) reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists; 
(c) reports of investigators employed by the commission; 
(d) reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts, 
or other records; or 
(e) hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee. 
Section 34A-2-802(2) Utah Code. 
To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the 
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that: 
(1) he sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments from the 
industrial accident; (2) he is permanently totally disabled; and (3) the industrial 
accident was the direct cause of his permanent total disability. To find an 
employee permanently totally disabled, the commission must conclude that: (1) 
the employee is not gainfully employed; (2) the employee has an impairment or 
combination of impairments that limits his ability to do basic work activities; (3) 
the industrial impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential 
functions of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until 
the time of the industrial accident; and (4) the employee cannot perform other 
work reasonably available, taking into consideration his age, education, past 
work experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity. Although 
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ei ititlement to other disability benefits may be presented to the commission if 
relevant, it is not binding on the commission and creates no presumption of an 
entitlement to permanent total disability benefits under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. See Section 34A-2-413(1), Utah Code Annotated (July I, 
1994). 
• • Af JALYblb 
Admissibility of Expert Testii i lor iv. 
The Petitioner objected to the expert vocational rehabilitation testimony 
offered by the Respondent in support of its claim that work is available to the 
Petitioner in the community and therefore, he is not permanently and totally 
disabled. The Petitioner relies on the requirements set forth in State vs 
Rimmasch, 775 P 2 d 388 (Utah 1989). 
Rimmasch examines the foundational showing required to establish the 
reliability of the scientific principles upon which scientific evidence or opinion is 
based. 775 P. 2 d 398. Essentially, the Supreme Court noted and addressed 
the danger of admitting any evidence that can be labeled " scientific" without 
regard to its reliability. For example, if an expert witness were to testify that a 
whiplash injury cannot result from the forces placed on the body due to a rear 
end motor vehicle accident, he would" need to provide evidence to show that his 
conclusion is reliable by showing it was developed based upon a systematic 
method in which a problem is identified, data is collected through unbiased 
observation and experimentation and that the hypotheses was developed and 
tested to show that it is accurate. This foundation requirement is meant to weed 
out unreliable junk science which' is not helpful to the trier of 'fact. 
I he vocational expert testimony p r esen ted in this case, however, is not 
independently based upon " scientific " principles such as engineering, medicine 
or physics. Mr. Evertsen qualified as an expert witness based upon his 
educatioi i in vocational rehabilitation, and his 33 years of experience in 
vocational rehabilitation Mr. Evertsen reviewed portions of Mr. Shearer's 
medical records, focusing on the two functional capacity evaluations. He 
administered the General Aptitude Test Battery or GATB, which was used to 
determine Mr. Shearer's aptitudes to identify occupations in which he is likely to 
succeed, and the Self Directed Search or S D S. which is used to help determine 
the types of ^ ;rk or endeavors that interest M ^ 
> 
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attorney, Mr. Prisbrey, on August 11, 1998. Mr. Evertsen inquired about Mr. 
Shearer's current symptoms, current treatment, medications and modalities, and 
his functions of daily living. During the interview, Mr. Evertsen observed that Mr. 
Shearer sat for only 30 minutes out of a 3.2 hour evaluation. Mr, Evertsen 
observed Mr. Shearer kneel for approximately 43 minutes during testing. 
Based upon his observations during the interview with Mr. Shearer and 
his partial review of the medical records, Mr. Evertsen concluded that Mr. 
Shearer is able to stand for considerable lengths of time without problem, he can 
walk up to 4 miles per day, and can lift but not carry. 
As noted above, Mr. Evertsen was aware that Mr. Shearer is a high-
school graduate and completed two years of Business College with an emphasis 
on accounting and management. Mr. Shearer has also received some training in 
solar technology and alternate energy sources. 
Based upon the test results reflecting Mr. Shearer's aptitude, Mr. Evertsen 
concluded that Mr. Shearer is capable of learning new tasks. Based upon the 
results of the Self Directed Survey, Mr. Evertsen concluded that Mr. Shearer has 
a wide range of interests suggesting he would enjoy any occupation in the 
investigative, realistic, conventional or artistic areas. Accordingly, Mr. Evertsen 
concluded appropriate work would include artistic craftsman, pharmacy helper, 
security person, dispensing optician, desk clerk, foster parent, and a school 
crossing guard. Mr. Evertsen noted that some of these positions may require job 
modifications, but that all are classified as Sedentary to light duty. Although 
there were other types of employment suggested by Mr. Shearer's test results, 
Mr. Evertsen felt those positions would possibly require modifications that would 
make them unfeasible . 
The Administrative Law Judge concludes that the role of a vocational 
rehabilitation expert is to assist an injured worker find employment by exploring 
options that the injured worker may not identify on his own because of his failure 
to recognize the transferability of his skills or the extent of his physical 
capabilities. Additionally, a vocational rehabilitation expert will have a network 
of contacts in various fields and knowledge of laws like the Americans With 
Disabilities Act which may enable him to open doors to employment that would 
remain closed to an unassisted job applicant. Thus, regardless of the testing 
performed by Mr. Evertsen, for which there is no scientific foundation, his 
testimony regarding his vocational rehabilitation efforts on behalf of Mr. Shearer 
is admissible, but doubts about the reliability of his conclusions will affect the 
weight given to his testimony. 
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Labor Market Research Information. 
Mi Evei tsei 11 lext coi iducteu <x idbor market survey to determine 
employment positions available in the Hurricane and St. George, Utah job 
market. Exhibit R-5 outlines the results of Mr. Evertsen's labor market survey. 
Mi , Evertsen testified that he checked with Jackie Lynn, the manager of a 
Maverick convenience store in Hurricane, Utah, an. employee leasing company, 
Resource Management, regarding a night watchman position at a juvenile group 
home in LaVerkin, Utah, Shell Food Mart, Best Western motel, Super 8 motel 
and Zions Health Center, an adult care center. 
At this point during the testimony, Petitioner objected to the hearsay 
evidence Mr. Evertsen relied upon in making his report. Although hearsay is 
generally inadmissible, Rule 703 of the I Itah Rules Of Evidence provides: 
II! Illi i! Ileitis oi data in the particular case upon winch an expert 
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made 
III mi in i /vn to the expert at or before the hearing If of a 1:\ [:: 3 
loasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not 
be admissible ^ ^"dence 
Although the traditional rule limits an expert's opinion testimony to 
personal experience and observatioi 1, I Jtah now recognizes " it is "within the 
discretion of the trial court to determine the suitability of expert testimony in a 
case and the qualifications of the proposed expert. However, once the expert is 
qualified by the court, the witness may base his opinion on reports, writings or 
observations not in evidence which were made or compiled by others, so long as 
they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in that particular field. The 
opposing party may challenge the suitability or reliability of such materials on 
cross-examination, but such challenge goes to the weight to be given the 
testimony, not to its admissibility. " State vs Clayton, 646 P , 2 d 723, 726 
(Utah 1982). 
F 1r. Evertsen explained that the best way to find out what's involved in 
performing a particular job is to talk to the employer. Mr. Evertsen concluded 
that Mr. Shearer could perform work as a motel desk clerk or night auditor, whicl 
requires no physical labor; night watchman at the juvenile group home which 
requires no lifting and would not require subduing juveniles. Mr. Evertsen 
testified that both of these jobs were sedentary jobs within Mr. Shearer's 
physical limitations and capabilities in accordance with the conclusions of Virgil 
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Beck and Dr. Root. 
The Administrative Law Judge agrees with Mr. Evertsen that the best way 
to find out about a particular job is to inquire with the employer, who is likely to 
know the job better than anyone else. Further, over the course of practicing 
workers' compensation law in this state for seven years, the Administrative Law 
Judge knows of other well-respected rehabilitation specialists who also rely on 
employers for specific job description information. Accordingly, the 
Administrative Law Judge concludes that Mr. Evertsen's reliance on hearsay job 
descriptions about the physical requirements of the positions he identified in 
Southern Utah is not fatal to his testimony. Under Rule 703 of the URE, an 
expert witness may rely on hearsay if it is of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions. It is clear that the hearsay 
relied upon by Mr. Evertsen is of a type reasonably relied upon by vocational 
rehabilitation experts. Therefore, his testimony is admissible. 
Permanent Total Disability. 
The Petitioner has the burden of proof to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he is permanently and totally disabled as a result of his industrial 
accident. Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, supra. In order to prove entitlement to 
permanent total disability benefits, the Petitioner must show he sustained a 
significant impairment or combination impairments as result of his accident, he is 
permanently and totally disabled, and that the industrial accident was the direct 
cause of his permanent total disability. Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(1)(b). 
Before the Labor Commission can conclude the Petitioner is permanently 
and totally disabled, it must first conclude that he is not gainfully employed, he 
has an impairment that limits his ability to basic work activities, the industrial 
impairment prevents him from performing the essential functions of the work 
activities for which he has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident 
and that the Petitioner cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking 
into consideration his age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, 
and residual functional capacity. Utah Code Section 34A-2-413(1)(c). 
The parties do not dispute that the Petitioner has a significant impairment 
as a result of his industrial accident at Lin's Marketplace in June 1995. However, 
the Respondent challenges the Petitioner's claim for permanent total disability, 
by asserting that there is other work reasonably available to the Petitioner in 
Southern Utah. Therefore, the analysis will focus on that portion of the statutory 
requirements. 
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Based upon the Petitioner's testii i IOI iy, it is clear that he is not gainfully 
employed. He has not worked for remuneration since January 1996. The 
Petitioner has a 10% whole person permanent impairment of the low back as a 
result of his industrial accident and subsequent surgery. The results of the 
functional capacity evaluations performed by Mr. Beck and Mr. Felix, indicate 
that the Petitioner's residual low back, impairment limits his ability to perform 
basic work activities. He is limited in his ability to sit, lift, twist, and work bent 
over a counter or chest type freezer. According to the functional capacity 
evaluation performed by Mr. Beck, the Petitioner cannot return to his prior 
employment as a Frozen Food Manager at Lin's Market Place. Even Mr. 
Evertsen, Respondent's vocational rehabilitation consultant, admits that the 
Petitioner should not return to the type of physical labor he performed in his prior 
j ::: b 
The parties disagree whether there is other work reasonably available for 
a man of the Petitioner's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, 
and residual functional capac it> Mr E * ertsen asserts that the Petitioner can 
return to work in some sort of light duty job where the employer is willing to 
provide accommodation for the Petitioners physical limitations. Mr. Evertsen has 
identified positions such as night clerk in a motel or night watchman at a juvenile 
group home as positions within the Petitioners physical, mental and educational 
capabilities. Mr. Evertsen's conclusions regarding appropriate work is based 
upon two functional capacity evaluations, the first performed in 1996 and second 
performed in 1999. However, the Petitioner, who seems to be quite credible, 
complains that both functional capacity evaluations caused an increase in his 
pain complaints. Accordingly, he argues he cannot return to full time work. 
I he Petitioner, who was 65 years old on the date of his accident is now 68 
years old. He is in reasonably good health and seems to take care of himself. 
He exercises regularly and watches his weight because he recognizes that he 
has a bad back and wants to be as active as he possibly can be. Despite the 
Petitioner's best efforts, he testified that he continues to suffer intermittent 
debilitating pain. 
i herefore, although the Petitior lei r nay be able to do certain types of 
physical activities on a " good day ," the evidence does not show that the 
Petitioner can continue to perform work activities, even of a sedentary nature, on 
a consistent basis . 1 he functional capacity evaluations, although they 
mi :d the Petitioner's physical capabilities over a short period of time, 
cannot accurately reflect the Petitioner's ability to work on a consistent basis, i.e. 
eight hours a day five days a week. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge 
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concludes that the Petitioner meets the requirements of 34A-2-413 (c). 
Finally, the Petitioner must show that his industrial injury was the "direct 
cause" of his permanent total disability. The Petitioner has suffered a number of 
injuries to his low back during the course of his employment with Lin's 
Marketplace. He continued to work despite those injuries until the injury of June 
1995 removed him from the workplace. 
After the accident, the Petitioner attempted return to work twice, but was 
unabie to remain at work due to his inability to tolerate increased pain. The 
evidence in the record indicates the Petitioner's desire to return to work in early 
1996 despite the recommendations of Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Root that he cease 
working. The Petitioner has no other physical problems which rise to the level of 
his lower back problems which limit his ability to work. Accordingly, the 
Administrative Law Judge concludes that the industrial accident of June 23, 
1995 was the direct cause of the Petitioner's permanent total disability. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Administrative Law Judge concludes that the Petitioner, Gordon 
Shearer has been permanently and totally disabled as a result of his industrial 
accident of June 23, 1995, since he stopped working on January 6, 1996. 
Therefore, the Petitioner is entitled to receive subsistence benefits beginning on 
January 6, 1996. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Petitioner, Gordon Shearer is 
permanently totally disabled and entitled to receive permanent total disability 
benefits to provide for his subsistence, at the rate of $225 per week for 312 
weeks, less the dollar amount of temporary total disability and permanent partial 
disability previously paid, plus interest at 8% per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Respondent shall notify the 
Administrative Law Judge within thirty days from the date of this Order whether it 
will or will not submit a re-employment plan pursuant to Utah Code Section 34A-
2-413(6). If the Respondent will prepare a re-employment plan, said notice shall 
include an estimate of the time required to finalize and submit the re-employment 
plan. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that after the initial 312 weeks, weekly 
sparer v ui- . iVsarKetplace 
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* '• - -nali oe reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount, r 
, i •' the S:-M/HI Socurity Retirement benefits received by the Petitioner during 
that same period. 
I I IS FUR1 "'HER ORDERED that the Respondent, Lin's Marketplace and 
Great American Insurance Company shall pay Aaron Prisbrey, Attorney at Law, 
an attorney's fee based upon a graduated contingency fee in accordance with 
R602-2-4, U A C , up to the maximum fee of $9,100. Said attorney's fees are to 
be deducted from the compensation awarded and remitted directly to the office of 
Aaron Prisbrey, Attorney at Law. 
I I IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party aggrieved by this decision may 
file a Motion For Review with the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor 
Commission. The Motion For Review must set forth the specific basis for re"-"" *A# 
and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the M^ 
For Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion For Review. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party may request that the Appeals 
Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct the foregoing review. Such 
request must be included in the party's Motion For Review or its Response. If 
none of the parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner. 
P A ^ 1 this JO day of January, 2000. ' 
Sharon J. Eblenf J 
Administnf!v° ! -W 
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Case No. 98-0065 
Lin's Marketplace and its workers compensation insurance carrier, Great American Insurance 
(referred to jointly as "Lin's"), ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative Law 
Judge's award of permanent tola: disability compensation to Gordon Shearer under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act i '"the Ac!"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann,).. 
i lie Laoor ^ uuUiii^ n-'Li c\ci uses jurisdiction ovei this motion for rev iew pui^ua;n u • ::J 
. \ .v Aim J?6^-46KP.. Utah Cc-Ac An n. §34A-2-801(3) and I Jtah Admin. Code R602-^ M 
BA( iOUND AND ISSUE 
I he parties agree that on JUI-C ^.J, I ^ J , MI. o nearer injured his back in a vv ork related 
accident. Lin's has accepted liability for benefits due Mr. Shearer under the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act as a result of his work related injuries. However, Lin's contends Mr. Shearer is 
not entitled to permanent total disability compensation because he fails to meet the requirement set 
forth in §34A-2-413 (c)(iv) of the Act1 that he "cannot perform other work reasonably available, 
taking into consideration the employee's age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and 
residual functional capacity." 
After a formal evidentiary hearing, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Shearer's claim did satisfy' 
§34A-2-413's criteria for permanent total disability compensation. Lin's then filed a motion for 
review with the Commission, renewing its contention that Mr. Shearer did not meet §413 (c)(iv)'s 
requirement This is the sole issi le now before the Commission 
1
 At the time of Mr. Shearer's work accident, the Act's provisions for permanent total 
disability compensation were codified as §35-1-67. Shortly thereafter, §35-1-67 was renumbered 
as §34A-2-413, without any substantive changes. For ease of reference, the Commission will 
refer to the Act as it is currently numbered. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission finds the following facts relevant to the issue now before it. 
As noted above, on June 23,1995, Mr. Shearer injured his back while working at Lin's. He 
has been rated with a 10% whole person impairment as a result of the injury. 
Mr. Shearer was born in 1931 and is now 68 years old. He is a high school graduate and has 
completed two years of accounting course work at Stevens-Henager School of Business. He also 
took courses in solar technology at Dixie College. 
Among other employment, Mr. Shearer worked as a supervisor in one of J.C. Penney's 
accounting units and as a bookkeeper for several businesses in Kamas, Utah. Later, he was 
employed by the U.S. Forest Service, primarily as a resource assistant preparing permits for timber 
sales. After 13 years with the Forest Service, followed by relatively short periods of employment 
in several varied positions, he worked as a cashier at Handy Mart and as a cashier/stocker at Lin's. 
Mr. Shearer contends he is severely limited from physical activity due to his back injury. 
However, his most recent functional capacity evaluation indicates he is capable of moderate activity. 
Mr. Shearer's own demonstrations of his physical abilities indicate he is capable of more than merely 
sedentary work. Likewise, surreptitious video recordings indicate Mr. Shearer is capable of 
relatively vigorous activity, including walking, bending, twisting, and light lifting. 
Mr. Shearer has also undergone vocational evaluations. The most persuasive of these 
evaluations, performed by Mr. Evertsen, establishes that Mr. Shearer has an above average ability 
to learn and perform new work tasks. Mr. Evertsen's evaluation also establishes that specific job 
opportunities existed in several different employment fields in the Hurricane/St. George area that 
are within Mr. Shearer's capabilities. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides medical benefits and disability compensation 
to employees injured in work related accidents. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401 of the Act. 
Among the types of disability compensation provided by the Act is permanent total disability 
compensation, subject to the specific conditions set forth in §34A-2-413. As previously noted, the 
parties agree Mr. Shearer injured his back in a work related accident while employed by Lin's and 
is, therefore, entitled to the benefits provided by the Act. The question before the Commission is 
whether Mr. Shearermeets §34A-2-413's requirements for permanent total disability compensation. 
Section 34A-2-413 of the Act establishes several specific elements which must each be 
established before the Commission may award permanent total disability compensation to an injured 
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worker. Among those elen lents is the requirement of §34A-2-413(c)(iv) that "the employee cannot 
perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's age, education, 
past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
i ne Luituiii^ion has careium reviewed aic evidence pi evented on each of the 10 .. u? 
components of §34A-2-413(c)(iv). The Commission concludes that Mr. Shearer's education m 
accounting and past work experience in accounting, handling government paperwork, and clerking 
experience fit very well with, the various employment opportunities identified by Mr. Evertsen. '! he 
Commission further concludes such employment opportunities are within Mr. Shearer's medical and 
functional capacity a nd that his age does not preclude him from,, such employment. 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Mr. Shearers' circumstances do not 
satisfy the requirement of §34A-2-413(c)(iv). Since Mr. Shearer must meet each, of the requirements 
of §34A-2-413, his failure to satisfy §34A-2-413(c)(iv) precludes an award of permanent total 
disability compensation to him. The Commission therefore sets aside the ALJ's award, of permanent 
total disability compensation, to Mr Shearer 
ORDER 
i lie Commission grants Lin s motion for review, reverses the decision of the ALJ and denies 
./arc's ?hir~ for nermane^ total disability compensation Tt i" so ordered. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
i !Vny party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the 'Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition .for review must be received by the court; within 30 days 
of the date of this order 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
GORDON SHEARER 
PAGE 4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of 
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Order Denying Request for Reconsideration 
Utah Labor Commissioner R. Lee Ellertson 
August 27,2001 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
GORDON SHEARER, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
LIN'S MARTKETPLACE and 
GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 
Gordon Shearer asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision denying 
Mr. Shearer's claim for permanent total disability compensation under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act ("the ActM; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-13. 
BACKGROUND 
The parties agree that on June 23, 1995, while Mr. Shearer was employed by Lin's 
Marketplace, he injured his back in a work- related accident. Lin's Marketplace and its workers' 
compensation insurance carrier, Great American Insurance, (referred to jointly as "Lin's" hereafter) 
accepted liability for any benefits which were due Mr. Shearer under the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act as a result of his accident. However, Lin's rejected Mr. Shearer's claim for 
permanent total disability benefits under the Act on the grounds that Mr. Shearer had not met the 
Act's criteria for such benefits. More specifically, Lin's contended that Mr. Shearer had not shown 
that he "cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's 
age, education, past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity" as is 
required by §34A-2-413 (c)(iv) of the Act.1 
In response to Lin's rejection of his claim for permanent total disability compensation, Mr. 
Shearer filed an Application for Hearing with the Commission to compel payment of the disputed 
benefits. After an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ ruled in Mr. Shearer's favor. Lin's appealed the 
1
 At the time of Mr. Shearer's work accident, the Act's provisions for permanent total 
disability compensation were codified as §35-1-67. Shortly thereafter, §35-1-67 was renumbered 
as §34A-2-413, without any substantive changes. For ease of reference, the Commission will refer 
to the Act as it is currently numbered. 
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ALJ's decision to the Commission. The Commission reversed the ALJ's decision and denied Mr. 
Shearer's claim on the grounds he had not proved he was unable to perform other reasonably 
available work, as required by §34A-2-413 (c)(iv) of the Act. 
Mr. Shearer then asked the Commission to reconsider its decision. However, because part 
of Mr. Shearer's testimony was missing from the record, the Commission remanded the matter to 
the ALJ in order to obtain Mr. Shearer's testimony. That having been accomplished, the 
Commission will now address the merits of Mr. Shearer's request for reconsideration. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
The Commission's initial decision concluded that Mr. Shearer's claim for permanent total 
disability benefits did not satisfy the requirement of §34A-2-413 (c)(iv) of the Act. Mr. Shearer asks 
the Commission to reconsider its decision on the grounds the Commission: (1) erred in relying on 
Mr. Felix's evaluation of Mr. Shearer's functional capacity; (2) erred in relying on Mr. Evertson's 
vocational evaluation of Mr. Shearer; (3) made inadequate findings; and (4) incorrectly applied 
§34A-2-413(c)(iv) to Mr. Shearer's claim. Each of these points is discussed below.2 
DISCUSSION 
Functional capacity: The record in this matter contains evidence from several sources 
regarding Mr. Shearer's functional capacity. Mr. Shearer has testified that he is severely limited in 
his ability to perform any tasks. Such testimony is self-serving, but more importantly, it is 
uncorroborated by any other evidence. Furthermore, Mr. Shearer's testimony regarding his 
limitations is inconsistent with other evidence, as follows. 
During mid-January 1996, a little more than four months after his back surgery, Mr. Shearer 
underwent a "functional capacity evaluation" by Virgil Beck, a physical therapist. It was Mr. Beck's 
conclusion that Mr. Shearer could meet the physical demands of sedentary work: 
Mr. Shearer does qualify for work at a sedentary work level which is described under 
the physical demand characteristics of work in the following manner: "sedentary 
work-exerting up to 10 pounds of force (occasionally): activity or condition exists 
up to 1/3 of the time and/or a negligible amount of force (frequently): activity or 
2
 The Commission has reordered the points raised in Mr. Shearer's request for 
reconsideration to allow for more orderly consideration. Also, because the Commission previously 
granted Mr. Shearer's request that the hearing record be reopened to obtain Mr. Shearer's testimony, 
that point will not be addressed further. 
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condition exists from 1/3 to 2/3 of the time to lift, carry, push, pull or otherwise 
move objects, including the human body. Sedentary work includes sitting most of 
the time, but may involve walking or standing for brief periods of time. Jobs are 
sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and all other sedentary 
criteria are met." 
During May of 1999, three and one-half years after his surgery, Mr. Shearer underwent a 
another functional capacity evaluation, this time by physical therapist Dell Felix. Mr. Felix 
concluded that Mr. Shearer could tolerate the physical activities of a "medium" work level, with the 
following explanation: 
This evaluation demonstrated that Mr. Shearer can tolerate activities in the MEDIUM 
Physical Demand Characteristic of Work Level. He feels that he must be careful in 
his reaching activities, limit his sitting tolerance, and avoid twisting. In spite of these 
limitations he was measured to be safe in moderate work activities with frequent lifts 
of fifty pounds and occasional carrying up to thirty five pounds. 
Furthermore, Mr. Shearer is in good general health and has maintained a daily exercise 
regime. A surveillance video taken on two consecutive days in November 1998 demonstrate his 
abilities to walk briskly for more than 3 0 minutes, lift and carry small items, operate a motor vehicle, 
twist, turn, bend, climb up and down from the bed of a pickup truck. Mr. Shearer did all the 
foregoing activities with no apparent pain or limitation. 
In summary, the Commission finds that Mr. Shearer is physically capable of work activities 
at least as strenuous as described in Mr. Beck's functional capacity evaluation. The Commission 
will therefore rely upon Mr. Beck's evaluation in determining whether Mr. Shearer meets the 
requirements of §34A-2-413(c)(iv). 
Vocational evaluation. Mr. Shearer contends the Commission erred in relying on the 
testimony of Dirk Evertson, a rehabilitation specialist, regarding Mr. Shearer's ability to find work 
that was within his physical capabilities. In particular, Mr. Shearer contends Mr. Evertson lacked 
information about Mr. Shearer' s medical condition as well as the specific requirements of the various 
employment possibilities identified by Mr. Evertson. The Commission does not agree. 
Mr. Evertson's knowledge of Mr. Shearer's physical capacity was the product of time spent 
with Mr. Shearer, Mr. Shearer's own description of his abilities and Mr. Evertson's review of the 
two functional capacity evaluations. Mr. Evertson's knowledge of the specific requirements of 
various employment possibilities derived from Mr. Evertson's personal conversations with potential 
employers in the St. George area. Mr. Evertson also drew from more than 30 years of experience 
as a vocational rehabilitation specialist, working with 2,000 to 3,000 clients. 
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Having once again reviewed Mr. Evertson's qualifications, expertise and knowledge of the 
circumstances relevant to Mr. Shearer's abilities, the Commission continues to find Mr. Evertson's 
vocational evaluation to be persuasive. 
Adequacy of Commission's findings: Mr. Shearer contends the Commission made 
inadequate findings of fact in its prior decision. It is true that the Commission did not address 
several issues, such as the circumstances of Mr. Shearer's work accident, his medical treatment and 
his compensation rate, that had been discussed in the ALJ's decision. The Commission did not 
consider these issues for the simple reason that neither party asked that they be considered. The 
Commission limited its fact finding to only those issues in actual dispute. 
With respect to the issues that were actually raised before it, the Commission acknowledges 
its duty to set forth the basis for its decision in adequate detail. The essential basis for the 
Commission's decision is explained in its initial order. This second order supplements and amplifies 
the first. The Commission believes that its two decisions, when taken together, adequately explain 
the basis for its decision. 
Application of $34A-2-413fc)fiv) to Mr. Shearer. As noted in the Commission's prior 
decision, one of the statutory elements which Mr. Shearer must prove in order to qualify for 
permanent total disability compensation is set forth in §34A-2-413(c)(iv): "the employee cannot 
perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's age, education, 
past work experience, medical capacity, and residual functional capacity." The Commission has 
concluded that Mr. Shearer has not proved the foregoing and that such failure is fatal to his claim 
for permanent total disability compensation. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission notes that, although Mr. Shearer is 67 years old, 
his general health and vitality is remarkable. His educational history establishes his literacy and 
cognitive abilities. Likewise, his work history demonstrates an ability to function in a work 
environment. It also shows significant expertise in accounting and the ability to follow policies and 
rules. His medical and functional capacity leave him capable of at least sedentary levels of exertion, 
as well as driving to and from work. While his medical and functional capacities do not permit him 
to return to his most recent work at Lin's, they allow him to work in other capacities, such as a 
hotel/motel clerk. Such employment is a recognizable, reasonably available occupation in the St. 
George/Cedar City area. The Commission therefore reaffirms its prior conclusion that Mr. Shearer 
has not established that he cannot perform other work reasonably available to him, as required by 
§34A-2-413(c)(iv). His claim for permanent total disability compensation must, therefore, be 
denied. 
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ORDER 
The Commission reaffirms its prior decision, as clarified and amended by this decision, and 
denies Mr. Shearer's request for reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
>< 
Dated this J? day of August, 2001. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For 
Review with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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